Absolutely, you’ve hit the core issue—this isn’t just about disagreement or a small faction pushing back. It’s about ensuring that every vote counts and genuinely reflects the real, affected users who stood to lose in this complicated DeFi situation.
If fake wallets or those created after the hack influenced the vote, then the outcome doesn’t represent the true community’s will, and that risks damaging trust not only in this compensation process but in the project’s governance as a whole.
Using a system like the Subsquare Collectives DAO, which can verify wallet authenticity and restrict votes to legitimate holders, is essential. It’s about having a majority that actually means something—one real user, one real vote—not an inflated number caused by manipulation.
For all of us who want to see justice done fairly and transparently, this step is not about overturning a decision on a whim; it’s about validating the entire process so that the community can move forward with confidence and unity, knowing the final outcome truly reflects the impacted users.
This approach ensures no voices are unfairly excluded or drowned out—and that’s something everyone can respect, regardless of which option they originally supported. @SeiyaChida
All proposed options have already been presented and discussed.
However, within the current Soneium/ASTR ecosystem, it is difficult to conduct an Off-chain Vote with adequate Sybil resistance.
Limitations of Off-chain Voting
Subsquare does not prevent Sybil attacks, and Snapshot is not yet integrated with Soneium.
Even if we attempted to calculate nsASTR/nrETH holdings across DeFi protocols using a voting tool, there would still be a significant risk of miscalculation due to the complexity of aggregating data from multiple protocols.
Any error in calculation would likely lead to questions about legitimacy, and strong calls from the community to redo the Off-chain Vote.
This would further increase confusion and damage trust within the ecosystem.
Validity of the On-chain Vote
In contrast, the On-chain Vote — as originally intended — is weighted by ASTR balance × conviction multiplier, ensuring greater transparency with no Sybil attack risk.
Even if one option is rejected, the most fair and credible path forward is to submit all options sequentially via On-chain Votes, enabling an open and objective decision-making process.
Importantly, it should be noted that ASTR cannot be withdrawn from the Treasury by any method other than an On-chain Referendum.
We sincerely thank all community members for your input and patience. Your participation in the on-chain vote is critical.
It’s critical for our community to vote NAY on the Snapshot Model proposal. This model fails to fairly represent many real users—especially those of us with DeFi positions and tokens locked in protocols—which are effectively excluded from Phase 1 compensation.
Voting “yes” on this snapshot risks legitimizing a flawed, easily manipulated outcome decided by wallets created after the hack or empty addresses, which do not reflect the actual affected users. We have valid reasons to believe this vote doesn’t capture the true majority of impacted community members.
Instead, we must push for a voting process that guarantees one real user, one real vote, like the proposed Subsquare Collectives DAO model, which can limit voting to verified wallets predating the hack and holding legitimate Neemo assets.
Don’t settle for a distorted result that undermines trust and fairness. Vote NAY to demand a transparent, inclusive, and Sybil-resistant voting process that truly honors the community’s collective loss.
I have a question: Is the voting power in this on-chain vote determined by the amount of ASTR you hold? If so, what about those of us who originally held ASTR but staked them to receive nsASTR, and are now frozen—wouldn’t that mean we cannot vote? If my understanding is correct, what is the point of such a voting mechanism?
Especially this on-chain vote, which is based on the results of an off-chain vote, but the off-chain vote cannot prevent fake wallet voting. Doesn’t this mean that the entire process is flawed, yet we are still being forced to accept it?
For me, only option 1 (Asset-linked/ Burn Model) is valid.
The previous offchain voting (duration: 2 days and open to all wallets) was a “joke”. We cannot create the onchain-voting based on it!
It’s hard for me to continue believing in the Neemo team and return the 204 million ASTR to Neemo without any guarantees. Especially since the Neemo team itself has expressed concerns about the feasibility/accuracy with Snapshot Model.
For all these reasons, I voted No.
The current voting is for a total of 7 days.
I would like to request the team eventhough Snapshot is difficult to use this time window to index all projects nsASTR and nrETH was part of and identify clearly all wallets affected by this hack. The upcoming 7 days will be crutial for Neemo Finance to showcase their capabilities to the community that they are working on the solutions to reimburse the affected users. Don’t use this timeframe only to wait for it’s outcome, please showcase the work you are doing now for the snapshot model. This will be crucial to gain the trust in case this referendum fails and we will vote for the new option.
It would be great if the team could update daily in this thread about the progress and what they have worked on. Including sharing the results. I’m looking forward seeing the results in the upcoming days.
To clarify things and prevent unnecessary accusations, I want to explain that the current referendum regarding the Neemo Finance incident was initiated by me, as a member of the Main Council, following the request and decision of the Neemo team.
This does not mean that the Main Council or the Astar Foundation is endorsing, supporting, or approving the compensation model decided by Neemo. We agreed to assist with the governance process so the vote could be fast-tracked, ensuring users wouldn’t have to wait several weeks for an on-chain vote to be initiated (as would normally happen under the standard governance queue).
Neemo’s team chose to proceed with the Snapshot model, based on their off-chain voting process, despite valid concerns about the legitimacy of that vote, concerns I also share, as the vote appeared to be heavily manipulated and likely inaccurate.
Regardless, the Main Council created the referendum as requested to respect the team’s chosen process. It is now up to the community to approve or reject this proposal and the return of funds to Neemo’s team.
2. Personal opinion
As you can probably tell from my words, I am personally against this proposal and will vote NAY, for two reasons:
The off-chain vote was clearly manipulated with hundreds of false wallets. It was not Sybil-resistant, and I believe not all impacted users were able to participate. This means the vote is not representative of the affected users’ choice and, in my view, invalid. Only affected users should decide on the compensation model, while ASTR holders will vote separately in the on-chain referendum to approve or reject the proposed plan. Since the off-chain vote is invalid, the on-chain vote should not be based on these circumstances.
I have already expressed my opposition to the Snapshot model and continue to believe the Split model (Option 2) is the better choice for both our ecosystem and impacted ASTR users. Moreover, the team itself has expressed uncertainty about implementing the Snapshot model, which makes me doubt their capacity to execute such a plan properly. I am concerned this could lead to further issues, errors, or mismanagement which would only increase frustration and negative sentiment around this matter. For these reasons, I believe the simpler option is best, and I will vote against any on-chain proposal that doesn’t align with this view.
I strongly encourage everyone to participate in this vote. We are deciding on the release of 200M ASTR, a significant amount of tokens that must be handled with care, expertise, and caution to prevent further issues.
I want to back the clear and responsible stance shared by our fellow Main Council member regarding the Neemo Finance referendum. It’s crucial to understand that while the Main Council facilitated this on-chain vote to speed up the governance process, that doesn’t mean they endorse the Snapshot model proposed by Neemo’s team.
Like him, I believe the off-chain vote was compromised by numerous fake wallets, making it neither Sybil-resistant nor representative of the true affected users. Using that flawed vote as a basis for this referendum undermines the legitimacy of the entire process.
The Snapshot model not only excludes many impacted DeFi users but also creates unnecessary risks due to the team’s admitted uncertainty about implementing it. The simpler and fairer Split model (Option 2) better serves the ecosystem and protects all stakeholders from further complications.
This vote is about responsibly managing 200 million ASTR tokens — a huge responsibility that demands transparency, fairness, and caution. I strongly encourage everyone to participate in the vote and stand with those advocating to reject the Snapshot model. Voting NAY is the only way to ensure the process truly reflects affected users’ interests and maintains trust within our community.
Let’s make our voices count for fairness and a better future for all Neemo and Astar users.
This is valid concern, and those who hold nsASTR are those who actually got the impact, and those who hold ASTR but not hold nsASTR to vote is not that fair, I still think that there should be another model for the compensation
I agree with and share the concerns many here have about how this vote was conducted.
I’m also concerned about the apparent lack of communication between Astar and Neemo.
@Seiyachida, as has already been mentioned here in the forum, it would be extremely important to keep the community informed — clearly and on a daily basis — about what is actually happening.
@Maarte, I understand this may not be directly your responsibility, but I believe that if Astar and Neemo could work together more closely and transparently during this delicate time, it would go a long way in keeping the community aware of what is — and isn’t — being done.
I think the same. The most accurate and fair is option 1 Asset-linked. Sadly, if they keep option 2, that will come out since the majority of users are from ASTR and they don’t care if it is fair or not, they will do what suits them best and the most they can take advantage of and that is to vote for option 2. Option 2 should not even be considered
True, I agree with what you said.
To be completely honest, however, I ask you: Is it fair and correct to allow on-chain voting only to addresses with ASTR? Is it fair and correct that those who only/or mostly had nsASTR (and therefore, paradoxically, those who HAVE THE MOST RIGHT TO VOTE because they are the injured party) not be able to vote?
From my perspective, the Split Model is the most logical choice, just as outlined by the council representative. The risks with the Snapshot Model are too great, especially considering the doubts around its implementation. The Split Model is straightforward and minimizes the chance for errors or disputes. I’m on board with this direction.
I recommend holding another vote using the “Collectives DAO” feature on Subsquare, as Maarten suggested.
However, since that would be based on one vote per account, if we want the voting power to reflect the amount of nsASTR or nrETH held, it is also possible to distribute voting tokens based on a snapshot taken before the exploit and use a governance platform like Snapshot (I just recalled that Snapshot now supports Astar as well) to conduct the vote.
It’s difficult to say definitively which method is better. If we seek justice, Snapshot may be appropriate; if we seek fairness, then using Subsquare would be more suitable.
If we place too much weight on token holdings, nrETH holders will be placed at a significant disadvantage. Therefore, I believe that prioritizing fairness and using Subsquare is the better option in this case.
Separately from the voting process, there are ongoing concerns about Neemo’s private key management. Is it acceptable to proceed while ignoring those voices?
After all, the original issue stemmed from the leakage of Neemo’s private key. While the system is now using multisig, it is understandable that people remain concerned. To address this, members from Astar Foundation, ACC, or AFC may need to become part of the multisig signers—at least until the completion of Phase 1.
There seems to be some misunderstanding, so let me clarify:
To move assets from the on-chain treasury, on-chain governance using ASTR is required. This is unavoidable. Allowing on-chain governance to be executed using other tokens or conditions would introduce a potentially fatal vulnerability to Astar.
Therefore, this part cannot be changed.
However, as I mentioned earlier, we can design the process so that a community vote that everyone agrees upon determines the course of action, and then an on-chain vote using ASTR is used for final approval of the asset movement.
This way, ASTR-based on-chain voting serves merely as the formal execution following consensus—similar to the relationship between a parliamentary resolution and a presidential signature.
What you’re saying is absolutely reasonable. However, I believe the most appropriate and reliable approach is to confirm the option selected through the Off-chain Vote via an On-chain Vote, for the following reasons:
Only an On-chain Vote using ASTR can authorize the movement of ASTR from the Treasury.
As you mentioned, ASTR cannot be moved from the Treasury through any method other than an On-chain Vote.
No matter what decision is made through an Off-chain Vote, it will not be finalized unless approved on-chain.
All options submitted off-chain have already been discussed and are directionally reasonable.
Limitations of the Off-chain Vote
Snapshot does not support Soneium, meaning it cannot be used to count the holdings of nsASTR/nrETH. Therefore, vote weight based on token holdings isn’t possible. While it’s technically feasible to create a separate vote token based on holdings including DeFi and ask users to vote with that, it introduces risk of miscalculation, which would undoubtedly lead to community backlash if even one mistake were made. And as mentioned earlier, even if it can be done, it would require substantial time to ensure full accuracy.
Another method would be to use Opensquare, but that would require:
Manually identifying all wallet holders of nsASTR/nrETH, and
Conducting a 1 wallet = 1 vote poll. This approach ignores large holders and risks further backlash by under-representing them.
Key Management Controls
We are currently consulting with the zeroShadow team through Seal911 regarding key management.We have no issue with including third parties outside the Neemo team as Multisig signers. In fact, our original design for the reimbursement contract’s Emergency Withdraw already included third-party signers.It is completely fine if Neemo team members do not hold any keys.
The beneficiary wallet is a Polkadot Multisig, with all signers using different ledger devices. If community would prefer to use a different signers, please let us know, we’re fully flexible. We have no issue with having all keys held by non-Neemo members.
As someone deeply impacted by this situation, I fully agree with the Main Council member’s assessment. The current off-chain vote was never truly representative, and the Snapshot Model introduces too much complexity and risk. The Split Model is simpler, more reliable, and it ensures fair treatment for all affected users. I support this approach and hope the community does too.
I’m not very happy with the way the entire process has been handled. I’d like to know why a direct answer to how the laptop’s private keys were stolen or hacked is consistently avoided. This raises further uncertainty about the team’s responsibility, and the lack of transparency doesn’t instill the necessary trust in the management of the new multisig wallet.
As things stand, it seems that many have already accepted the loss and are simply trying to get their tokens back as quickly as possible. Prolonging the refund process too much will only lead to further discontent and friction within the community, and I hope the next vote is conducted professionally and is the final one. @SeiyaChida
Absolutely agree with your concerns. The ongoing lack of clarity about how the private keys were compromised is a serious issue, and the team’s unwillingness to give a direct answer only increases doubts about accountability and future security. Transparency is the foundation for trust—without it, it’s hard to feel confident in any new multisig setup.
Many users have clearly reached the point where they just want closure and their funds returned. Dragging out the compensation process any longer will only deepen frustration and fracture community trust even further. I fully support your call for straightforward communication and hope the next vote is handled with the professionalism and finality everyone deserves.