Proposal to Change ASTR Tokenomics to Fixed Supply

I feel that the discussion is starting to lose focus, so I’d like to organize the key points once again.

Setting an upper limit on ASTR issuance has, in simple terms, the following advantages and disadvantages:

Advantages:

  • As the total supply becomes limited, this will have a positive impact on ASTR’s value.

Disadvantages:

  • In effect, this would result in a gradual phase-out of dApp Staking.
  • It could raise sustainability issues for Astar as a public blockchain.

There is no need to elaborate further on the value appreciation of ASTR under the advantages.
I will provide more detail regarding the disadvantages.


1. In effect, this would result in a gradual phase-out of dApp Staking

The proposal mainly focuses a 2–3 year timeframe, but from a long-term perspective, dApp Staking will effectively lose its functionality. In 10 years, token emissions will be about 1/8 of current levels; in 30 years, they will be almost zero.

Of course, in the near term, dApp Staking will still function and continue to provide yields to both stakers and developers.
Staker yields (%) will certainly decrease, but since emissions will also decrease, the inflation-adjusted real yield will not decline significantly at first.
For developers as well, parameters such as slots can be adjusted, and if ASTR price rises, yields can be maintained for the time being.

However, the fundamental issue is not about maintaining yields—it is the fact that dApp Staking is guaranteed to disappear in the long term.
We need to consider whether this is a positive or negative outcome for the ecosystem.
Yield levels are a minor concern in comparison.

Originally, Astar was known for various distinguishing features. Currently, dApp Staking is one of the few remaining features with any real significance.
If this is eliminated, the chain will become heavily reliant on alignment with Soneium—that is, it will become highly dependent on Startale and its business development.

This is not necessarily a bad thing in itself—if other organizations or companies, besides Startale, were to take a leading role, it could be positive.
However, given the relationship with Sony, this is likely to be difficult to achieve in the short term.

Ultimately, it comes down to the question: What is Astar aiming to become?


2. It could raise sustainability issues for Astar as a public blockchain.

Token emissions are currently distributed to the Treasury and to Collators.

Collators serve the same role as validators on typical PoS chains and are critical infrastructure for maintaining the chain.
Since Astar is a Parachain, it does not require as large a reward as a typical L1—but if these rewards are entirely removed, the number of collators will decrease significantly, reducing decentralization and increasing single points of failure.
This would undermine the core advantages of running a blockchain.

There has been talk of AFC stepping in to cover these rewards, but entrusting this responsibility to an organization that has no proven track record yet is overly optimistic.

Additionally, the Treasury is used to fund various ecosystem activities. Recently it has funded ACS, and it will also be used for Coretime purchases going forward. Coretime prices remain unstable and speculative, making future planning difficult.
AFC aims to generate revenue from Treasury management to help fund these activities, but whether this will succeed remains uncertain.
Again, it is too optimistic to rely on this at this stage.


In the end, this boils down to: Where are we placing our priorities?

Based on the current proposal, it seems the primary goal is to increase ASTR’s value.
This is not inherently a bad thing—but different community members have different priorities, which is where the current friction arises.

Perhaps Astar Evolution Phase 2 will provide a clearer vision.
This proposal may well be linked to Phase 2—but since this is not yet confirmed, we can only discuss what is currently visible.
Most likely, no firm conclusion will be reached at this time.

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Thank you for organizing the discussion.
I think it might be better to discuss whether or not to put an issuance cap on Astar after the information on Astar Evolution Phase 2 is released.

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This is an excellent summary, and I think hits the nail on the head with respect to some tough realities this community needs to face, which are extra hard to process when so many of us are emotionally invested in Astar due to project work and/or ASTR holdings over the years.

It seems to me that Astar has largely become a staking chain, and a marketing channel; with the primary goal of the marketing to build up a user base for Sony to tap from day 1. Soneium is the culmination of this, and now Sony has a chain with a ready made user base generating impressive looking stats. Good job Startale.

Seems pretty clear to me that everything now hinges on Startale figuring out a profitable way of building in a genuine need for ASTR into Soneium projects/eco.

Eventually the efforts to do this “for the community” will end if they just create more effort to build and don’t unlock greater profits for the builders. With ETH already native to Soneium, it feels like odds are stacked against ASTR. Perhaps the only hope is the ASTR marketcap represents some millions of dollars of capital assuming price stability, and attracting this capital is interesting to commercial enterprises.

That said, all of this “do a meaningless txn to earn a meaningless NfT/badge” activity is imo just a bunch of crap. Maybe mild entertainment for some in a very short timespan, but its not anywhere close to what is going to rescue ASTR’s value prop in the long run.

There was a great pod cast released this week with the CEO of Mythical Games where he talks a bit about the MYTH token and how they are prioritising different incentives to keep it valuable whilst also ensuring the company makes a profit. This is just one example, but as a fellow parachain on Polkadot I think it could be a good source of inspiration for those wondering what good could look like. Obviously MYTH itself is in a massive price slump at the moment, but it has a fixed supply and very practical use cases with a suite of games with real chunky user bases. FIFA mobile game launching this week too…

Are we going to see Sony tap all of its IP, including PlayStation to release web3 games/experiences that require ASTR in some meaningful way? Or are we going further down a marketing badge + yield farming circle jerk until the last diehards sell out?

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Thank you @you425 for taking the time to organize the discussion — it really helps refocus the conversation.

You’re absolutely right that moving toward a fixed supply has both clear benefits and important tradeoffs. I’d like to offer a few thoughts in response, particularly on dApp Staking and the broader sustainability question.

On dApp Staking Phase-Out

Yes, this proposal implies that over the long term (10-30 years time frame), dApp Staking as we know it will gradually phase out if ASTR token price does not increase significantly. But perhaps the more important question is: Has dApp Staking truly delivered the impact we hoped for?

While it has been a flagship feature for Astar, we should ask ourselves:

  • How many high-performing or widely adopted dApps have emerged because of dApp Staking?
  • Has it meaningfully helped builders reach product-market fit?
  • Or has it, at times, incentivized participation for the sake of rewards rather than long-term value?

This isn’t to discount the value of past efforts — many builders have benefited from it. But in today’s evolving Web3 landscape, maybe it’s time we rethink how we support developers. Instead of relying solely on inflationary rewards, we can explore more targeted, performance-aligned models that drive lasting growth.

The idea isn’t to abandon support — it’s to evolve the mechanism to ensure it’s sustainable, effective, and future-proof.

On Sustainability and Public Blockchain Viability

Regarding collator rewards and treasury use: it’s a valid concern. But we should clarify that collators on Astar, as a Polkadot parachain, do not play the same role as L1 validators in securing the network — security comes from the Polkadot Relay Chain. So while incentives matter for decentralization, liveness won’t be compromised.

That said, decentralization remains important. If collator participation drops or centralization risk grows, the Astar Finance Committee (AFC) can allocate non-inflationary incentives from existing fee revenue or reserves to ensure a healthy node set.

Similarly, the treasury’s future use will need to be prudent. While Coretime prices and other variables introduce uncertainty, the proposal includes multiple non-inflationary levers (like protocol-owned liquidity and fee redirection) to strengthen long-term sustainability.

Imo, this proposal is not a rejection of what brought us here — it’s an evolution. It’s about asking honest questions, adapting to real-world conditions, and ensuring that Astar is built to thrive not just in the next cycle, but for the next decade. Thank you

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Thank you for your reply, especially amidst your busy schedule.

Yes, that is absolutely right.
This point has been raised multiple times by others in the forum as well, and it shows that we need to re-evaluate the value of dApp Staking.
However, it’s important to distinguish between two different motives that could drive its removal:

  • “We want to introduce a supply cap for ASTR” → valuation-focused
  • “dApp Staking has not delivered meaningful results” → functionality-focused

These are fundamentally different purposes.
Neither is inherently better than the other, but governance participants should align on the underlying rationale before a collective decision is made.

This is precisely the uncertainty that concerns me.
If we are being realistic, we must first calculate how much revenue the AFC will need post-inflation.
The following are the currently available variables:

  1. Current Treasury balance
  2. Block rewards until inflation stops
  3. Revenue from gas fees (20%)
  4. Yield from AFC-managed assets
  5. Cost of Coretime
  6. Operational costs like collator rewards

Of these, 4 and 5 lack enough historical data to model accurately.
Still, it is possible to simulate different scenarios and identify key parameters.
If we’re going to implement a hard cap on supply, this level of due diligence should be mandatory.

If that isn’t feasible at this time, then, as I previously mentioned, we should introduce a floor to inflation.
After that, we can observe the ecosystem over the next decade (e.g., with a 0.5% inflation floor) and make decisions later.

It’s far better to add a supply cap later than to implement one now and be forced to reverse it.
However, if the community decides that a hard cap is desirable for short-term price impact, I am willing to accept that choice.


Decision-Making Framework

Ultimately, I believe our discussion needs to converge around the following two axes:

:white_check_mark:Re-evaluation of dApp Staking

  • A: Continue — Introduce a minimum inflation rate
    → What should the floor be?
  • B: Gradual phase-out — Follow the current proposal
    → Must be accompanied by a thorough sustainability assessment
  • C: Immediate termination — Remove developer rewards from inflation
    → Requires a full tokenomics redesign alongside B

:white_check_mark:Sustainability Assessment

  • A: Inflation is necessary
    → To what level should inflation be reduced, and how will dApp Staking be handled?
  • B: Fixed supply is acceptable
    → How will dApp Staking be handled?

It’s worth noting that there has been no outright opposition to reducing the inflation rate.
The two central concerns are:

  1. The purpose and future of dApp Staking
  2. The sustainability of Astar as a public blockchain

As reference, there have been examples where chains with a hard cap reissued tokens or later removed the cap:

  • Polygon: Removed the cap when transitioning from MATIC to POL
  • Cronos: Reissued CRO that was previously burned

In Polygon’s case, it largely went unnoticed.
In Cronos’s case, however, governance concerns triggered significant backlash.


In my view, a minimal level of inflation is essential for sustainability.
One potential model would be issuing tokens only for AFC operations and burning them if unused.

Alternatively, replacing dApp Staking with treasury-based grants could also be considered a viable solution.

If we cannot reach a definitive decision now, then we should set an inflation floor and revisit the issue in the future.
No one can predict what will happen years down the road.

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Hello @Mingshi san

This is the first time I’ve learned that you have doubts about the effectiveness of dApp Staking. Thank you.

I feel that the current Dapp Staking has the following problems.

  • There is no mechanism to track the development progress or marketing metrics of dApps.
  • Commuty Treasury and Astar Core Contributor remain Tier 1 and do not function as developer support.
  • There is no established development model flow using dapp staking for development teams or developers within a developer community that is not supported by an enterprise.

I believe that these issues are the reason why dApp staking does not run smoothly and the ecosystem does not develop.
These are not problems with dApp staking per se, but operational issues – and they are solvable.
Why give up on Dapp Staking without solving these problems and observing the results?
Even if these issues are resolved, will Dapp Staking still have no utility?

You mentioned that dApp Staking should be abolished and replaced with a new, sustainable, effective, and future-proof developer support mechanism.

What would such a system look like?

Before proposing Tokenomics 3.0, shouldn’t we first present a proof of concept (PoC) for the new approach and demonstrate that the new approach can truly surpass dApp staking as a developer support mechanism?

Definitely NO!!!

Finally, this discussion is being brought up. Thanks @Mingshi

I’ve been an active participant in the dApp Staking program since day one.
I was involved in onboarding the very first dApps and NFTs , witnessed the first rugs in the ecosystem (Astarians NFT, AstarPunks, AstarBots, Orcus Finance, etc), saw incubated projects get abandoned or getting no traction (AstridDAO, Starfish, Avault, Starlay, Arthswap, Sirius Finance, etc), and actively contributed as part of the SpaceLabs team (the voluntary bizdev and onboarding group). Based on all this, here’s my conclusion:

  1. In the beginning, teams from various ecosystems came to explore Astar as it was a new network — and the vast majority were rugs, only interested in farming rewards. Even after spending hours on calls, doing due diligence, doxxing teams — in the end, we’re dealing with people, and that’s the biggest “risk factor.”

Also, I’d like to mention that @moonme was one of the members of the Astar growth team and actively participated in all meetings with project teams — he certainly had access to internal insights.
I really miss Toga’s involvement in the ecosystem.

  1. With clearer and stricter rules in place for dApp Staking, the SpaceLabs team aimed to onboard high-quality projects. We held hundreds of meetings with teams worldwide. The two most common scenarios we faced were: early-stage/seed projects, or more mature projects looking for grants. The seed-stage ones lacked community and resources to survive long-term, while the more mature ones would only deploy if there was a grant involved (money talks — this is crypto, not philanthropy, haha). In short, dApp staking incentives were irrelevant to projects already profitable on other chains.

With that said, I strongly support reducing rewards for dApps and focusing instead on targeted UCGs or treasury-funded grants tied to clear roadmaps and deliverables.

The current “let the builders build” model — where the community decides who gets rewards based on staking — hasn’t proven effective. In general, the community doesn’t really care about what’s being built or the actual utility behind it, as long as the APR is high and there are financial incentives like airdrops.

In the end, we’re funding projects that don’t add value to the ecosystem — at the cost of increased inflation, more token emissions, and dilution of the token’s value.

I’m in favor of a complete restructuring of the program.

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@pitcoin777 i have also been in the community from Day 1 and agree 100%.

Nothing wrong with experimenting and that is what dApp staking was - an innovative experiment. Many lessons to be taken from it but let’s not continue with a sunken cost fallacy.

Couldn’t agree more with the restructuring and grant based approach.

There are MANY innovative projects and developers we could attract to Astar with this approach.

Would love to get this fast tracked through governance to be honest

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If the Community Council’s dapps evaluation work well, won’t this problem be solved?
And since there were voices saying that it wasn’t working well in the Japanese community, we proposed a mechanism to track DApp development progress and marketing indicators.

Isn’t the problem not DApp staking itself, but the lack of a mechanism to track DApp development progress and marketing indicators?

What do you think about the issue that the Community Treasury and Astar Core Contributor remain Tier 1 and do not function as developer support?
In the end, UCG is just the Community Council handing out money collected from dapp stakers, which I don’t think is healthy.

It’s similar to how governments collect taxes and hand out subsidies.
Don’t you think the money raised by dapp stakers should go directly to developers?

If the core team can build great developer support features beyond dapp staking, I would support the restructuring, but the important thing here is that the core team probably doesn’t have any concrete ideas for them right now.

At least, no specific specifications have been stated.
This is not related to Sony, so there is no need to hide it.

Reconstructing dApp Staking (B2E) is a promising direction—but it absolutely requires a clear and detailed plan.
While there are suggestions to shift developer incentives entirely to UCG or direct grants, it’s not a simple replacement.

People are viewing this issue from different timescales and angles, which is why the discussion often feels fragmented.
For example, I personally view this with a 30-year horizon, with long-term sustainability as my highest priority.


:small_blue_diamond: UCG (User-Chosen Grants)

Currently, UCG rewards are drawn from the dApp Staking emission pool.
If dApp Staking is phased out, UCG becomes unusable under the current model.

One alternative would be to list only UCG-approved projects on dApp Staking,
but if we go that route, it would make more sense to increase the Treasury allocation from block rewards and fund projects directly via structured grant programs.


:small_blue_diamond: Direct Grants

However, direct grants have their own issue:
ASTR inflation is expected to stop in the future, which means this funding source will eventually dry up.
While some revenue will come from gas fees, it’s marginal.
And placing too much expectation on the unproven AFC is not a sound strategy.

We cannot look at dApp Staking in isolation—it has to be considered in the broader context of ecosystem financing.


:small_blue_diamond: Stakers

If we’re going to restructure dApp Staking, what becomes of the stakers?
As I mentioned earlier, UCG could be repurposed in a non-standard way, but that approach feels inelegant and insufficient.

Would we consider enabling NPoS-style staking?

I think a gradual reduction of yields, as proposed here, is acceptable.
But a sudden elimination of staking rewards would be a shock to the community and likely unacceptable.

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In reality, not much changes… Making dApp staking permissive only opens the door for lazy teams and early-stage seed projects to dominate. On the other hand, making dApp staking exclusive to top-tier projects isn’t financially attractive for them.

What we currently have is a system that funds 99% of dApps that won’t make it, while inflation keeps increasing day by day.

A chain with constant inflation and low value generation in terms of TVL and usability is likely to drift toward negligible token value over time.

You’re proposing a solution to a problem — but we don’t want the problem in the first place.

Tracking dApps can help to some extent, but there are too many subjective factors involved:

  • The database would have to rely on information provided by the dApps themselves — meaning we’re ultimately dependent on what they choose to disclose.
  • On-chain metrics only work for a specific group of dApps.
  • The time and effort required to constantly report and share data may not be a priority for many teams, especially when the rewards aren’t significant enough to justify it.
  • Marketing is a highly subjective metric — we recently had an example of a dApp that, for many, seemed like a marketing success story with strong community support, yet it turned out to be just another rug.

This same example also proves that the “let the builders build” or “community is king” approach may not be the most reliable path forward.

Several red flags had already been raised by Agents, but the community kept supporting the project — simply because they were receiving staking rewards, airdrops, etc.
In the end, the rug happened and only confirmed what many of us had anticipated.

Honestly, most holders would prefer to see those tokens burned rather than dumped into the market for dApps that are not going to make it.
This cycle repeats itself year after year — the community is tired.

Support for seed-stage teams needs to be structured, coordinated, and accountable — not something where teams are free to do what they want, when they want, how they want, and still keep receiving rewards, essentially harming holders through inflation.

Let me be clear: I don’t blame the players — I blame the game.

The community treasury is funded this way.
Concrete proposals with real value, clear roadmaps, and tangible, value-generating outputs can and should be submitted for funding.
This is the kind of approach we should be encouraging.

It’s far better to have one or two strong dApps that generate real value, than to support over 45 irrelevant ones.

We have a handful of dApps that are actually delivering — and those are the teams we should be supporting and incentivizing.

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We are funding high staking yields without generating any real value for the network.
It’s completely unsustainable — there’s no long-term logic behind it.

The only justification is the short-term gain of those staking: earn rewards, sell, and repeat the cycle.
Astar should not be seen as a cash cow.

If users are looking for yield, then go to DeFi — there are countless opportunities within the ecosystem.

That way, we’d actually be incentivizing dApp usage, boosting on-chain metrics, generating fees, and driving real activity.

As long as the “stake and sleep” mentality exists — where tokens just sit idle and earn absurd yields with zero risk — no DeFi dApp will be attractive.

In the end, the very mechanism meant to support the ecosystem is what’s killing its DeFi potential.

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@pitcoin777
Yes, I believe what you’re saying is correct.
If staking yields are higher than DeFi yields using ASTR, most people will naturally prefer staking.
So guiding users by saying, “If you want yield, move to DeFi” is not wrong in itself.
Also, I agree that a significant portion of the sell pressure on ASTR comes from staking rewards.


However, this cannot be evaluated in isolation.

If dApp Staking were suddenly removed, many holders would panic-sell, triggering a significant price shock.
While it’s easy to say “just use DeFi instead,” the reality is:
What DeFi opportunities currently exist that generate meaningful yield using ASTR?

In most cases, yield is generated via LST-related mechanisms, which heavily depend on the existence of dApp Staking.
So if dApp Staking disappears, the main incentive to use ASTR also disappears.
Yes, this is a chicken-and-egg problem, but that’s precisely why sudden removal would be dangerous.

That’s why I’m not opposed to a gradual transition.
(Incidentally, I think that your opinion is to eliminate dApp Staking all at once at a specific time.)


If we are going to phase it out, we must gradually lower the yield while simultaneously building out ASTR-based DeFi use cases and utility.
Only once the DeFi ecosystem is mature enough, can we safely pivot away from dApp Staking without triggering a collapse in user confidence or price.

I’m not interested in debating this as an isolated technical detail.
I want to talk about it in a multi-dimensional, interconnected way.

That is an essential perspective when discussing tokenomics.

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I would not want to have to monitor dapps and developers if I didn’t want to, but as long as Astar is a developer support chain and we need to ensure the health of developers, we need a mechanism to ensure the health of dapps and developers in any case.

And since you probably didn’t understand the proposal I made, I will answer the four points you raised here.

  • The database would have to rely on information provided by the dApps themselves — meaning we’re ultimately dependent on what they choose to disclose.
    → We require all developers to have data that allows us to track development progress, such as roadmaps, specifications, and github read permissions.

  • On-chain metrics only work for a specific group of dApps.
    → I think it is possible to track the dapp groups you need by interacting with the Astar collator, rather than relying solely on existing applications like dapp radar.

  • The time and effort required to constantly report and share data may not be a priority for many teams, especially when the rewards aren’t significant enough to justify it.
    → Dapp developers do not need to send data continuously. They should not be trusted as they may tamper with the data to protect themselves. What is needed is monitoring.

  • Marketing is a highly subjective metric — we recently had an example of a dApp that, for many, seemed like a marketing success story with strong community support, yet it turned out to be just another rug.
    → The problem was that the definition of the marketing indicators was wrong. We need to define the correct marketing indicators so that we can track them.

Astar will need to create a mechanism to track the health of developers and dapps anyway, which should be easier than rebuilding dapp staking.

But you are also a proponent of on-chain governance, doing away with sudo. Do you believe in the community(dapp staker) or not?

I agree with this opinion. I also think that the game design is wrong. However, I think that it is an operational problem, not a dapp staking problem.

Also, it seems that you did not answer the following questions I asked accurately.

Let me ask again. What do you think about the fact that a non-Dapps group called Community Treasury and Astar Core Contributors has been Tier 1 for Dapp Staking for three years, undermining the integrity of developer support in Dapp Staking?

The Foundation is also actively considering this matter, and we plan to open it for broader community discussion soon. That said, we want to emphasize the importance of maintaining high-quality dApps within dApp Staking.

From our analysis, many stakers choose to stake on Core Contributors or the Community Treasury because these options are seen as trusted and reliable. Since occasional stakers often don’t have the time or context to research every project in detail, they naturally gravitate toward entities they recognize and trust. As a result, lower-performing or less-transparent applications tend to receive significantly less support.

We acknowledge that this current setup can limit support for newer developers, and the Foundation will be proposing changes in the coming weeks to address this. With new, high-quality projects like AltLayer joining the ecosystem, we expect more trusted options to emerge, making it a good time to revisit the role of Core Contributors and the Community Treasury in dApp Staking.

However, this is a separate issue from the Tokenomics 3.0 proposal. @AstarPunks, please refrain from merging these discussions. The current topic is focused specifically on the proposed changes to ASTR’s tokenomics (e.g., moving to a fixed supply).

If you’d like to continue the conversation about Core Contributors or Community Treasury in dApp Staking, please wait for the dedicated thread we’ll be opening shortly, or feel free to start a separate discussion.

Let’s stay on topic to keep the conversation productive and focused.

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@Gaius_sama
I am happy to be able to discuss this with you.
I have been a fan of Astar since its release, the first public chain created in Japan, and it has a wonderful mechanism called Dapp Staking, and I sincerely hope for the success of the Astar chain.
I don’t intend to lose to anyone when it comes to my feelings for the Astar Chain!
I look forward to your continued guidance and encouragement!

In other words, the Foundation has recognized that the Community Treasury and Astar Core Contributors have remained Tier 1 or Tier 2 since the release, which may have undermined the reliability of developer support for Dapp Staking.
I don’t understand why members of the Community Council and Core Team would conclude that Dapp Staking is a failure before resolving these issues.

Also, after reading my discussion so far, do you think I lack understanding of the importance of maintaining high quality dApps in dApp staking?

Isn’t the problem that the mechanisms for maintaining high quality dApps in dApp staking led by the Community Council are not working?

For example, Alt Layer and Kyo Finance from the Soneium ecosystem are currently applying for Dapp Staking.

So what is the Community Council doing to maintain high-quality dApps?
There are a lot of positive comments in the thread above (I agree).
But I don’t know what the Community Council is doing to evaluate high-quality DApps.
Please tell us specifically.

Your analysis is clearly accurate.
In fact, I also believe that staking destinations with the Astar icon are unlikely to be delisted and are the most reliable staking destinations, so I have been staking there ever since Astar was released.
In retrospect, this is probably an obstacle to dapps developers.

I don’t understand this opinion.

Tokenmics 3.0 means the gradual abolition of Dapp Staking, and core team members and community council members have mentioned that Dapp Staking was a failure.
I am arguing that even if that were the case, there were obvious operational problems and the true capabilities of Dapp Staking could not be measured.

And other people besides me have also mentioned Dapp Staking, right? Core team members, community council members, and other agents.
Why did you only pay attention to me? Please give me a logical answer.

Is my argument unproductive and off-topic?
Being productive means having a discussion to find a good direction for the Astar chain, Therefore it doesn’t mean we can’t voice our opposition to this proposal, right?
If I can logically agree with this proposal, I will support it.
If I cannot logically agree with it, I will argue against it. Of course.
This is a natural attitude for me as I aim to become an Astar technical agent.

What I would like to know most is whether the core team has any concrete ideas on building a developer support mechanism beyond dapp staking while executing tokenmics 3.0.

To keep the conversation productive, we welcome your input as a member of the Core Team and Community Council. @Gaius_sama

I don’t see any statement from Core Team or Community Council suggesting that Dapp Staking is a failure. Personally, I don’t believe it is—I’m committed to improving it and addressing the model’s current challenges. If a single member expresses a certain opinion on the forum, it doesn’t mean that all members of the Community Council or Core Team share that view. Again, I do not agree that Dapp Staking is a failure, and I say this as someone who is part of both the Community Council and the Core Team.

Bringing up the Dapp Staking concept, tier system issues, or the difficulty in attracting high-quality dApps—while blaming the Community Council—feels off-topic for this discussion, which is specifically about Tokenomics 3.0.

To clarify, the original proposal in this thread does not suggest scrapping Dapp Staking. On the contrary, it proposes retaining Dapp Staking while adjusting inflation parameters to move toward a fixed supply model. If you’d like to have a broader discussion about the successes or challenges of Dapp Staking, I encourage you to open a dedicated topic. Continuing that debate here will only sidetrack the core discussion and hinder progress on the proposal at hand.

I also encourage members participating in this discussion to go beyond simply sharing opinions and to suggest concrete modifications or adjustments to the proposal. Sharing concerns without proposing solutions doesn’t help refine the proposal—it often leads to new issues without a path forward, which isn’t productive.

All opinions are, of course, welcome on the forum, but actionable ideas are what truly help us move things forward.

Thank you!

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I agree with you.

dApp Staking is not a failure.
It is important to solve the problems of the current model and make continuous improvements.

However, tokenmics 3.0 and dapp staking are incompatible.
My understanding is that DApp staking generates developer support and staker yields through inflation, so a move to a fixed supply model will lead to the phasing out of DApp staking.

I am not blaming the Community Counsel.
I am blaming them for making this proposal, which will lead to the phasing out of dapp staking, before resolving the operational issues.

And as expected, it seems that you cannot tell us a concrete plan for dapp staking that is compatible with tokenmics 3.0.
Therefore, I cannot support tokenmics 3.0 at this time.

I am trying to at least present a viable idea.
Even if it is not perfect, I am trying to find a way to improve it.

However, without efforts by the Community Counsel towards disclosure of information to ensure the health of DApps, we cannot discuss and propose improvements.

Astar is ultimately aiming to become a DAO.
Even if Sony’s story is unavoidable, let’s make all information as open as possible.

Thank you @Gaius_sama :wink: