Yes, I agree. I feel that the discussion has become too narrowly focused on dApp staking, preventing a proper discussion of tokenomics. If we are going to discuss dApp staking in detail, it would be better to move the discussion to a separate thread.
I will repost the points I summarized from my previous perspective.
As stated above, changes to tokenomics are related to the long-term viability of dApp staking and the long-term sustainability of the chain, so it is necessary to discuss each point in detail.
My current conclusion is that I am opposed to fixing the supply, and I recommend fixing the inflation rate once it has been reduced to a certain level.
To begin with, I think the timing of the proposal of tokenmics 3.0 is wrong.
The reasons are as follows:
Operational issues with dapp staking have existed since its initial release and not all have been resolved, so the true potential of dapp staking remains unappreciated.
If dapp staking had true potential, it might be possible to expand the ecosystem and increase token values even with the current inflationary design.
There is already a shortage of developers, so the benefits for developers should not be gradually reduced.
The core team does not have a concrete strategy and it would be foolhardy to move forward with this proposal.
Furthermore, the opinions of dapp developers are not reflected at all in this discussion, which is very dangerous.
Yes, I don’t think what you’re saying is wrong.
However, it’s clear that your perspective comes strongly from the developer side.
When it comes to Tokenomics, we need to take a multi-faceted view.
Given Astar’s current situation, I do believe that reducing the inflation rate itself is appropriate.
But the real questions are:
How far should inflation be reduced?
How should that reduction be implemented?
The current proposal ultimately suggests completely stopping token issuance, which—by extension—means phasing out dApp Staking.
As we’ve discussed before, it all comes down to what the core objective is.
In this case, the primary intention seems to be increasing ASTR’s value through lower inflation and a fixed total supply.
So, focusing only on dApp Staking won’t move the conversation forward.
Yes, dApp Staking is closely tied to this, but we must approach it as part of a broader balance.
For the first few years after these changes, it’s still possible to maintain developer rewards by adjusting parameters,
since many dApp Staking slots are currently unused.
That gives us a short window where the system can continue functioning,
but long-term planning must account for the inevitable structural consequences.
Astar is a chain for improving developer incentive design, so it is natural that developers should be the first to be given preferential treatment.
That is how the ecosystem will develop.
I understand that you’re trying to follow this discussion faithfully.
However, did you know that today, Cody, a member of the core team, said on Discord that this topic was “It is clear that the current Dapp staking is not working as originally intended, and we are exploring a new direction together with the community”?
Most likely, the root of the issue is exactly what Cody described.
It’s only natural that a system would become distorted if discussions proceed based on a misunderstanding of the fundamental problem.
As someone with knowledge of tokenmics, it is natural that you have the following questions:
As someone with knowledge of system develop, I think this way.
Should Astar, the developer support chain, really suppress inflation, which cuts into developer profits?
If managed correctly, isn’t it possible for the ecosystem to develop and the token value to increase without suppressing inflation?
Therefore, isn’t inflation control the last resort to increase token value?
Isn’t there anything else that should be done before tokenmics?
That’s why I say the timing of proposing this topic is wrong.
If all of the following issues were addressed, do you believe that Astar cannot grow under its current tokenomics?
Establishing mechanisms to ensure the soundness of dApps
Excluding non-dApp entities from participating in dApp Staking
Clarifying, tightening, and automating the rules for dApp Staking listings and delistings
If, after addressing the above points, you determine that growth through dApp staking is no longer viable, we recommend moving forward with the Tokenomics 3.0 discussion.
Let’s move the discussion on dApp Staking to a separate thread.
Fortunately, this proposal does not immediately change Tokenomics, so we have enough time for discussion.
Please create a new thread for this.
I wouldn’t say there’s no possibility.
However, what makes it difficult is the idea of “proper management” itself — if that were easy, no project would struggle.
Even national fiat currencies continue to experience inflation because they cannot be properly managed.
From a value perspective, if supply continues to outpace demand, the value will naturally continue to decline.
Therefore, keeping issuance under control is not inherently wrong.
For example, if all dApp Staking slots were filled, around $1 million worth of ASTR would be distributed annually under the current inflation model.
(In reality, fewer than half the slots are filled, so actual distribution is much lower.)
Clearly, that amount of emission is unnecessary, so I believe lowering the inflation rate and reducing total issuance is reasonable.
For reference, here is a simulation showing how developer rewards would change under this proposal:
I am in favour of fixing the supply of ASTRs, as well as reducing inflation. The supply of tokens is much higher than the demand, affecting the price of the token. I believe that much of the income from staking is being dumped, further affecting prices.
A good idea would be to set a minimum of 6 months of staking to receive 100% of the APR. If you rescue first, you lose a portion of your income. Hydration has an interesting and participatory staking model, because the more the holder participates in the votes, the faster the release of income.
These are improvements that can increase community participation and project adherence.
Hey @Juminstock that’s and interesting idea to push forward the participation on Subsquare/Governancer. Maybe we can learn cool stuff from Hydration model and find the approach that fits the most to Astar. Thanks for the suggestion @COSTA
That’s interesting. Since Hydration has a mechanism called “Omnipool,” directly adopting it might be difficult, but its underlying concept could be a good reference.
@COSTA Costa, thank you for bringing this fabulous idea that perfectly aligns with our goals of increasing community participation in onchain voting and Astar’s governance processes.
This needs to be carefully evaluated, as we’re talking about a significant change for stakers (users). Restricting fund withdrawals could be seen as centralization or manipulation, which would reflect the opposite of Astar’s future… but again, it’s a matter of evaluating it.
@pitcoin777, @tksarah, I’ll research this documentation and plan a structure that can be developed by the Community Council, at least at the structural level.
When I suggested 6 months of blocking to receive 100% of the APY, it is because at Hydration it is 240 days (8 months), so that you receive 100% of the income. You can withdraw income first if you participate in all votes. The system will reduce the deadline as you vote. But you can cash out both the proceeds and your tokens in staking at any time (only you will receive the rewards released until that moment). It is a model that rewards holders who do not withdraw the proceeds monthly, which causes selling pressure and token devaluation.
Incorporating a feature like Hydration is an excellent idea.
Currently, many stakers simply leave their assets idle after staking, turning it into little more than a yield-generating mechanism. However, using mechanisms like this to strengthen governance and turn stakers into active participants in the operation of the chain is a fantastic initiative.
The challenge lies in the fact that the already-complex dApp Staking system will become even more complicated. This increases the difficulty for stakers and new participants to fully understand how it works. Additionally, there are concerns regarding how voting rights will be handled for ASTR staked via exchanges or LSD platforms. This could result in disproportionately large voting power.
You’re absolutely right @COSTA! Hydration’s model is a smart way to reward long-term commitment and reduce selling pressure. Introducing a similar system would help turn staking from a passive rewards tool into something that actively strengthens the chain. It encourages people to engage more with governance, not just lock up tokens and forget about them. It’s a great step toward making the ecosystem more sustainable and community-driven.
Yes, this is absolutely true. However, while it does increase complexity, we can create educational materials (community posts + documentation) and plan educational sessions around it. Coordinating with the Ecosystem Agents to help distribute and expand this content could help counterbalance the complexity.
Just an idea!
Also, this is an important point to consider, especially regarding exchanges, as they would hold a significantly high concentration of ASTR. I’m curious to know how Hydration addresses or plans to address this issue. Do you know, @COSTA?
Hydration does not have this problem with exchanges, as staking is exclusively in its application. Even the staking and participatory voting model. Participation in all votes allows you to reduce the time limit for the redemption of 100% of the rewards.
I’ve draft something like this… it’s just an example that I would like @Juminstock brings to the Foundation. It really worth debating about it. Also I will try to connect with Hydration team to understand their model better.
Please, read the docs above and if have any doubts can open a ticket on discord or ask on Hydration Telegram. The team is super cool.
Aligning dApp Staking Rewards with Long-Term Holding & Governance Participation
As Astar evolves, it’s essential that our incentive mechanisms not only reward token holders, but also foster long-term commitment and active participation in governance.
Inspired by Hydration’s model, I’d like to propose a refinement to the current dApp Staking system:
Core Concept
Stakers receive 100% of their APY only if they lock their tokens for 6 months. Rewards are unlocked gradually, and governance participation accelerates this process. Users can exit at any time, but only receive the portion of rewards that have vested until that point.
Why This Matters
Currently, daily reward withdrawals contribute to constant sell pressure, harming the token’s price stability and undermining long-term value creation.
By introducing a time-vested and governance-linked model, we aim to:
Decrease token dumping through delayed reward access
Encourage governance by making vote participation a way to accelerate vesting
Reward loyal holders who commit to the ecosystem over time
Potential Impacts
Area
Expected Impact
Selling Pressure
Reduced due to delayed reward access
Governance Participation
Increased via reward acceleration by voting
Token Velocity
Lower short-term liquidity, higher stability
Token Price Stability
Improved due to less monthly dumping
Challenges
User Resistance: Some users may dislike delayed access to staking rewards.
Technical Complexity: Integrating flexible lock periods and vote-based unlock schedules could increase system complexity.
Governance Quality: Votes might be gamified just to unlock rewards unless participation standards are enforced.
Suggested Improvements
Tiered Reward Structure
Example:
1-month lock = 30% of APY
3-month lock = 70% of APY
6-month lock = 100% of APY
Governance Boosters
Users who vote in X% of governance proposals unlock their rewards faster.
Gamification Tools
Integrate NFTs or loyalty badges to incentivize long-term and active stakers.
Open Questions for the CommunityShould this model replace or coexist with the current dApp Staking system?
How can we ensure meaningful governance rather than reward farming through votes?
What would be a fair unlock schedule that balances user liquidity and tokenomics health?
As I mentioned in my previous comment, my biggest concern remains the governance voting mechanism.
In addition to the voting power imbalance, I believe there is also a risk that some community members may vote without thoroughly considering the implications. However, at this stage, the priority should be creating a clear path for users to participate in governance voting. In that sense, I think gamifying the governance process during this initial phase is a valid approach.
While I can’t say for sure whether it would be effective, it might be worth considering an incentive where voters who supported the winning proposal receive a slightly shorter unbonding period—or conversely, a small penalty for voting on the losing option. This could encourage voters to think more carefully about their choices. Of course, there’s also the possibility that people might just vote for the most popular choice anyway, but those who tend to follow the majority probably would have done so regardless, so the impact would likely be minimal.
There are also some technical implementation details to consider. Under the current dApp Staking system, any interaction such as “Vote” or “Move” will automatically trigger a “Claim” as well. However, since this proposal involves revamping the claiming mechanism itself, that may not be an issue in practice.
One more suggestion: if users are not withdrawing their rewards, perhaps those rewards could be automatically restaked. This could support internal compounding for LSTs, benefit users who prefer to compound their earnings, and potentially address concerns about liquidity retention.
Hi @COSTA ,
I’m not very familiar with Hidration’s governance model, but this locking mechanism with early unlocks for users who are active in governance is really interesting.
I completely agree with @you425 that we also need to consider the added complexity to the already complicated dApp staking system, which is quite hard for new users to understand. If we add more features like extended locks with early unlocks for governance activity, I’m afraid it could end up being a model that pushes users away rather than attracting them to our ecosystem.
An idea that could be interesting to explore instead is allocating a portion of the current BONUS REWARD to users (stakers) who actively participate in governance (at least 80% of the votes within the VOTING + BUILD&EARN cycle). This wouldn’t increase the complexity of dApp staking but could motivate many users to engage in governance in order to receive the GOV BONUS at the end of the cycle.
Core Concept
Stakers receive 100% of their APY only if they lock their tokens for 6 months.
Why This Matters
Potential Impacts
Selling Pressure
Governance Participation
Token Velocity
Token Price Stability
Challenges
Suggested Improvements
Open Questions for the CommunityShould this model replace or coexist with the current dApp Staking system?