I wouldn’t have any doubts about the quality of the dApps if the Foundation or a centralized entity actively collaborated. The point, as I’ve already said in other threads, is that as long as the rewards from passive staking remain higher (or at least not lower) than those potentially offered by the dApps, people won’t move a single ASTR toward them, regardless of their quality.The real challenge is to make this happen in a parallel way: you can’t just randomly lower passive rewards and hope that people magically start using the network. Like it or not, the core business of Astar remains dApp staking, so we need to develop parallel mechanisms that make dApp rewards higher and more attractive than passive staking, thereby encouraging real network usage without demoralizing the community."
My position hasn’t changed from before. dApp Staking is not a failure—it’s an excellent mechanism.
The reason why dApps that truly contributed to the ecosystem did not emerge comes down to three points:
-
Each dApp must clearly define its goals and milestones and present metrics to Astar holders.
This mechanism should not rely on external tools like DefiLlama, but instead be implemented as a function of the Astar Portal itself.
Only then can the community have a proper foundation for discussing dApps. -
Even now, I often hear rumors that dApps considered unhealthy are listed on dApp Staking.
In other words, it’s unclear whether the current Community Council is actually fulfilling its responsibility to maintain the health of dApp Staking, and I even question whether this is a role the Community Council should be handling at all.
We need a listing and delisting mechanism for dApp Staking that can be automated to the greatest extent possible. -
Astar holders need to understand that by engaging in dApp Staking appropriately, they can increase the value of the Astar tokens they hold, and they must vote with a sense of responsibility.
However, the Astar community as I know it was not formed as a true community, and therefore could not do this.
I believe this can be improved through the introduction of a guild system.
In other words, what needs to be done regarding dApp Staking is not to destroy it because it hasn’t functioned properly so far, but to understand why it didn’t work and improve it.
Relying on centralized mechanisms like UCG is not appropriate for Astar, which aims to become a DAO.
What’s needed is the culture and systems that allow it to grow as a DAO community.
I hope this opens the floor for debate.
The dApp Staking model was originally designed to support promising projects that were building on and contributing to Astar. Entry requirements were intentionally kept low to give new projects the opportunity to join the program and quickly receive support from users through staking. In practice, however, this approach proved ineffective and allowed a number of low quality or questionable projects to enter and extract value from dApp Staking. That said, it is not too late to address this.
What if we shifted the model from broadly rewarding all projects in the ecosystem to a stricter framework focused on a limited number of high quality projects? In other words, moving away from onboarding volume and toward rewarding the top projects in our ecosystem.
Concretely, we could keep the core idea of dApp Staking while removing much of the complexity introduced in V3. Instead of allowing an unlimited number of projects, we could cap participation to 10 or 20 slots, with inclusion decided by the Main Council, ACC, or through governance. Entry requirements would be significantly higher, with only leading projects in the ecosystem eligible to participate and benefit from dApp Staking.
Projects would be subject to regular reviews. If a project stops developing, enters a free riding mode, or no longer contributes meaningfully to the ecosystem, it would be removed from dApp Staking. Replacement would not need to be immediate and would only occur when a strong candidate emerges. This approach would also introduce a degree of competition and gamification, incentivizing projects to remain among the top 10 to 20 in order to retain their slot.
This would move dApp Staking away from a passive, entitlement based system for dApps and toward a more competitive model. It preserves Astar’s identity while ensuring that only high quality projects earn ASTR rewards. Fewer participating dApps would also mean either lower overall inflation or higher rewards concentrated on the top 10 to 20 projects. Finally, this framework would allow us to clean up dormant or inactive projects among the roughly 69 currently listed in dApp Staking, effectively a long overdue spring cleaning.
Thoughts?
Gaius_sama 
Astar Foundation
First of all, thank you to the Astar Foundation for opening this discussion in such a transparent and honest way. These are not easy topics, and the fact that you’re openly acknowledging what isn’t working and inviting builders and holders into the conversation is exactly the kind of governance maturity Astar needs at this stage.
A clear diagnosis: v3 is not working
Let’s be honest: dApp Staking v3 overcorrected.
The system became too complex (lock + stake, tiers, bonuses, voting periods, resets).
Freeriders still exist, despite all the added mechanics.
User behavior didn’t change most still “stake and forget.”
Developers lost predictability, with many earning significantly less and unable to plan sustainably.
Tiers failed to deliver real differentiation: Tier 1 is unreachable, Tier 4 is demoralizing.
These are real problems, and builders feel them directly. Ignoring this would be irresponsible.
Why Plan B goes too far
That said, I strongly believe Plan B (removing dApp Staking entirely) is too radical.
dApp Staking is not just a reward mechanism it is one of Astar’s core differentiators. It embodies the Build2Earn philosophy: token holders directly supporting builders without relying exclusively on grants, VCs, or centralized committees.
Removing it would:
Turn Astar into a fairly standard PoS network.
Push developer funding back into more centralized, less scalable models.
Break a core narrative that attracted many builders (myself included) to Astar in the first place.
“If dApp Staking disappears, many serious builders will simply look elsewhere not because Astar failed, but because its unique edge did.”
“Yes, simplicity matters but not at the cost of identity.”
The right path: a stronger, simpler Plan A
The solution is not deletion, but evolution. I strongly support a revamped Plan A, built around four principles:
- Extreme simplicity (back to v2 mechanics)
One action: lock → nominate → earn continuously.
No tiers, no bonus periods, no voting windows, no resets.
Era-based rewards that are predictable for both stakers and developers.
Simplicity is not regression it’s refinement.
- Aggressive, transparent curation
The freerider problem is not a staking problem it’s a listing problem.
The ACC should have clear, public criteria for listing and delisting.
Minimum on chain activity, usage, TVL, or delivered milestones.
Periodic reviews (automated + manual). Inactive or non committed projects should not receive rewards. Full stop.
- Hybrid incentives based on real value
Base rewards proportional to stake (preserves “support what you believe in”).
Automatic bonus multipliers tied to on-chain metrics (usage, fees, TVL, transactions). No complex voting let data speak.
- Adjustable reward split via governance
Start conservatively ( %/% in favor of stakers) to reduce inflation pressure.
Let the community adjust over time based on outcomes.
Aligned with Tokenomics 3.0
This model fits perfectly with Tokenomics 3.0:
Lower inflation via decay.
Fewer wasted emissions thanks to strict curation.
Optional: fee-based mechanisms (buyback/burn) layered on top over time.
Most importantly, it restores trust: builders regain predictability, stakers regain clarity, and Astar preserves what makes it unique.
Call to action
Astar doesn’t need to abandon Build2Earn it needs to fix it properly.
I encourage builders, stakers, and governors to rally around a simplified, curated, data driven revamp of dApp Staking. Let’s collaborate on criteria, metrics, and governance processes and vote for an evolution that keeps Astar builder-first without sacrificing token sustainability.
Suggestion: add working group or RFC process led jointly by ACC + builders to co-design the revamp.
Let’s make dApp Staking something we’re proud of again.
I think it’s a really good idea, and if that mechanism can be operated through automation and community governance, it would be the best way to make it a DAO.
I also believe that the problems we’re currently facing would be greatly improved. 
It wouldn’t change anything if the rewards don’t drop significantly—let alone if it were a DAO making the decision… Different ideology altogether. Astar no longer has a community—not anymore—that’s strong enough to handle something like that…
But it seems like a guild system has emerged recently, and if appropriate roles and incentive designs are added within it, more people will be able to contribute in various ways.
Because of that, I think there’s a real possibility that a strong community could be formed going forward.
For now, though, Astar’s Discord feels overly strict with bot and spam countermeasures, giving it a tense atmosphere.
I think the community’s main hubs—like Discord—will need to be improved so they’re more fun and comfortable places to spend time.
Especially since I believe Astar is meant to grow by supporting developers and people who want to try building something in Web3 but don’t have much funding.
If those kinds of people don’t gather, it’s probably a chain that can’t really grow.
After all, Astar is a developer-support-focused chain…
I think we can both agree that we have very low utility on etheruem because:
Interest on Ethereum: 0%
Interest on Astar: 11.4%
So for every month that your ASTR is on Ethereum you’re losing 1% of it’s value.
Dapp staking on ethereum could be huge if it was done properly.
But dapp staking as it is not working and should probably be stopped.
I’m more in favour of B but still disapprove of:
“Users lock ASTR and earn staking rewards directly.”
Might as well just get rid of the staking thing and build the utility into the token. Then let the treasury decide if we have interest at all and where it goes..
What I think would work is if we mint 2% ASTR a year and use it to buy back ETH..
Then after 35 years we have options like “100% ASTR buyback with ETH”..
Just look at how many Astar users are participating in the guild… Anyway, I don’t want to argue about it. I believe we’re in a situation where Astar and its community need to be completely rebuilt from scratch. Trust is so deeply rooted underground that there’s no point in delaying any longer. Once Astar and its community are united again, we can aspire to become a DAO. Of course, this is just my opinion and doesn’t matter…
I’m not trying to argue—I just want to make Astar better.
As long as Astar is a public chain with a mechanism like dApp Staking, aiming for a DAO is inevitable.
What Astar needs is incentive design that allows the DAO-ified community as a whole to function, along with a community that is contributive and proactive.
Through that, I believe the motivation to increase Astar’s token value—and the variety of ways to do so—will gradually grow within the community.
An environment where developers can program with both EVM and Wasm is still an attractive place for builders.
If you can develop with EVM, you can also connect to the Ethereum economy through Soneium.
Ideally, projects that want to participate in dApp Staking will emerge organically from the community,
and Astar’s original role may be to support those projects—helping them use dApp Staking, receive backing, and turn their ideas into reality.
I would bet that maybe maximum 15 of those dApps are actually generating any value whatsoever.
- Purge every existing dApp.
- Raise the barrier / threshold for entering dApp staking.
- Have every dApp re-apply.
- Significantly raise the rewards for dApp staking builders.
- Have users stake to a single entity.
Hello everyone! I’m glad to see the discussion has expanded. As a brief reminder, please let’s keep the conversation focused on the topic of Tokenomics and dApp Staking.
I’d like to create a short summary of the most frequently mentioned points so we don’t lose track of them.
@you425 proposes some interesting values to consider in the event of a complete removal of dApp Staking as we know it. This proposal places greater emphasis on governance and introduces potential rewards for those who participate in it.
At the same time, it proposes the integration of a variable that would support a sustainable supply over time.
@Amil_Gaoul argues that removing dApp Staking would effectively remove Astar’s identity and the Build2Earn philosophy, which is why considering option 2 is not viable.
@pitcoin777 argues that option 2 is the most viable given the current state of our ecosystem, and that introducing a grants-based model would allow continued support for dApps.
Meanwhile, @Gaius_sama proposes maintaining dApp Staking but limiting entry to a fixed number of dApps (15–20). This would help focus funding on high-quality, high-value dApps.
@ERC20s proposes expanding dApp Staking and the ASTR token to ecosystems such as Ethereum.
@FFR23’s proposal focuses on delisting every project from the program and significantly raising the barrier to entry.
I highlighted valuable discussion points that I personally noticed, but this is only an overview of many important ideas that have been discussed here.
I encourage participants in this conversation to structure ideas that can be in synergy with others, as the ultimate goal is to think collectively about what is best for our ecosystem.
Hi @Juminstock and team,
first of all, I want to genuinely thank you for this post. It creates real space for new ideas and for a deep structural rethinking, which I believe is exactly what Astar needs at this stage. Opening the discussion in such an honest and transparent way is the right approach, and it’s great to see the Foundation actively listening to the community and acknowledging the current issues.
Regarding tokenomics, personally I don’t feel the need to add much at this point. Inflation has already been reduced significantly, and with Tokenomics 3.0, the decay factor, and the upcoming adjustments, I believe the direction is correct and consistent with long-term sustainability.
Where I do feel strongly compelled to share my view is on dApp Staking.
I’m very glad to see that the Foundation is openly considering truly radical options and not just incremental tweaks. That, in my opinion, is a very positive signal.
While Solution A has good intentions and clearly aims to restore simplicity and intuitiveness—especially for new users who currently face a lot of complexity before even being able to stake—I honestly believe that this approach would not fundamentally change the situation. In practice, I don’t see it delivering meaningful new benefits compared to what we already have, nor solving the core structural problems that have persisted over time.
For this reason, I believe the system needs a much more profound reset, and Solution B feels like a much stronger foundation to build upon.
From a user perspective, Solution B retains all the main advantages of Solution A: a return to simplicity, the removal of complex staking mechanics (voting periods, Build2Earn dynamics, bonuses, resets, etc.), and the ability to maintain attractive APRs.
However, the key difference—and the most important one—is that it directly removes one of the weakest points of the current model: the continuous waste of ASTR inflation.
By completely removing dApp-based staking and moving users toward a single, unified staking contract/dApp, this approach would eliminate rewards flowing to inactive, low-quality, scam, or purely mercenary dApps that have historically provided little to no value to Astar.
In such a model, the Foundation could then use the rewards generated by this unified staking mechanism to fund official, high-quality, highly reliable dApps, built with ASTR fully at their core. This would drastically reduce inflation waste and redirect resources toward products that genuinely strengthen the ecosystem and ASTR’s utility.
This is, of course, just my personal view—but overall, I’m strongly in favor of exploring this kind of solution, as it feels more honest, more sustainable, and better aligned with real user behavior.
Thanks again for opening this discussion. I really appreciate the direction this conversation is taking.
Very well said. 
I really appreciate the clear focus on long-term sustainability and real user behavior rather than surface-level fixes. The point about inflation leakage and misaligned incentives in the current dApp staking model is especially important 
Thank you for your valuable contribution to the conversation, @SimonB.
I agree with you that dApp Staking needs a deep adjustment in how rewards are handled for projects that have brought no real value to the ecosystem. This is where proposals like those from @pitcoin777, @robert12342, and @Matt make sense, because they move us from a model of “I earn rewards for being part of dApp Staking” to one of “I earn rewards because I contribute to Astar’s growth.”
However, as G’ mentioned earlier, we are proposing the removal of the balance by focusing only on the user’s perspective. What about the builder’s perspective?
From its inception, dApp Staking was created with the mission of allowing users to support their favorite dApps because the contributions of those dApps deserved to be rewarded. If we choose Plan B, this would no longer be possible. While I understand that moving toward a grant-based system sounds appealing, as I mentioned, it disrupts the existing balance.
I am not saying that I support one specific plan over another; I simply want us to keep in mind the existing repercussions for the dApp Staking narrative.
@SimonB, what are your thoughts on this?
@you425 also had some good input here, would you like to share it?
@pitcoin777 has been a relevant critic of dApp Staking for a long time, could you share your ideas?
Let’s keep debating this important topic for our ecosystem, community!
I already wrote my opinion in an earlier comment, but looking at how the discussion has unfolded so far, there seem to be very few views as disruptive as mine.
It feels like many people are leaning toward Plan B, but I think we need to look more closely at the root of the problem.
Up to now, the reason dApp Staking has been criticized ultimately comes down to poor token performance. In searching for the cause of that, dApp Staking has become the main target. As I’ve written before, since the supply–demand balance directly affects ASTR’s price performance, thinking naturally gravitates toward improving inflation, which is the primary source of supply.
If ASTR’s performance were strong, these kinds of arguments probably wouldn’t be happening at all (or at least they would be much quieter). Of course, in such a scenario, the listed dApps would likely have shown much better activity as well—but that’s another matter.
That said, the main contributors on this forum are not developers, but general community members. Looking at the flow of the discussion so far, it’s clear that support for continuing developer rewards through dApp Staking mainly comes from developers themselves, or from people with a similar mindset. Ideally, developers from listed projects should be actively voicing their opinions in a place like this, but so far that has hardly happened. In that sense, if developers are not proactively engaging here, then moving forward with something like Plan B could be considered reasonable in its own way.
However, as mentioned earlier, I believe the path that led us here is essentially:
“ASTR performance is poor → reduce sell pressure from inflation → reduce developer rewards.”
The argument that “listed projects are not contributing enough to the ecosystem” does have some validity, but if that were the main issue, it could simply be addressed by delisting them quickly. While such opinions do exist, they don’t seem to be the majority.
In the end, most of the voices here are from general holders, and even if they aren’t consciously aware of it, I feel that the conclusion of “reducing developer rewards” is being reached under the premise of “protecting one’s own interests while reducing sell pressure.”
If that weren’t the case, it would be very strange that almost no one is analyzing the situation based on actual inflation figures, as I have.
We really need to think carefully about “what we are trying to improve in the first place.”
Cutting developer rewards alone will hardly change ASTR’s performance. Making protocol changes driven by emotion is unlikely to lead to good outcomes.
If we truly want to change the environment surrounding ASTR, I believe bold changes are necessary (not necessarily my proposal). That said, major changes take time, so introducing something like Plan B as an interim step does make sense.
In any case, we need to analyze the root causes—both emotional and structural—and then consider effective measures.
At least from my perspective, Plan B does not solve the core issues, and while I do see similar opinions in this thread, they seem more like compromises than real solutions.
I completely agree with you on this, and as G’ mentioned earlier, it’s important to evaluate both sides of the initiatives we aim to implement, specifically, both holders and builders.
Currently, the largest source of inflation comes from staking rewards, not from developer (dApp) rewards. So if we analyze it from that perspective, removing this participant does not actually have the level of impact we might think.
However, @you425 you raise two critical points:
- What are we actually trying to solve?
- From which perspective are we looking at the problem?
Most of the conversation has focused on the second point, where participants have expressed that developers have not contributed enough to the ecosystem, that V3 introduced significant changes that limited user participation, that dApp Staking should be expanded to other ecosystems such as Ethereum, and so on.
Discussing this second point is valid and within the scope of this conversation. However, evaluating point number one seems crucial at this moment.
I invite more participants to engage in a discussion around point one.
Yes, I agree—what we need are calm, well-reasoned opinions from a broader range of participants.
At the moment, it feels like the means and the ends have been reversed.
If Plan B is adopted and rewards to dApps are reduced, and performance still does not improve afterward, the discussion will inevitably move on to finding the next target. That target is unlikely to be staker rewards, and there is a high probability that rewards for Agents, AFC, ACC, and similar entities would be reduced instead.
I’m not saying that this outcome would necessarily be bad in itself, but proceeding without a clear understanding of the overall structure is extremely dangerous. In the worst case, we could end up in a situation where only stakers are left.
I want to be clear that I’m not making these points because I’m worried about my own Agent rewards being reduced. I’ve never converted my Agent rewards into cash; I’ve only used them within the Astar ecosystem. My primary exposure is through dApp Staking as a staker, and beyond that, I use ASTR to participate in DeFi on Soneium.
As a result, ASTR is not particularly tied to my real-world livelihood, and I don’t have a direct financial motive here.
I’m raising these concerns purely from the perspective of ensuring the healthy, long-term development of the ecosystem.
Maybe i’m missing the point, but option B is reducing rewards to dApps that don’t generate any value.
In my mind, we should be increasing or / and maintaining rewards for dApps that are building.
Tier 4 rewards - defunct.
Tier 3 rewards - not enough for serious builders.
At the moment +80% of dApps are effectively dead.
Let’s increase threshold for being a part of dApp staking and support high-value dApps with effective staking rewards.
The community can’t be relied upon to monitor dApps that are key to Astar success.
Astar is too immature right now and we need a level of centralisation (see Polkadot W3F scrapping OpenGov)
This is Option B to me, while Option A is keep the tier system which is a failure to date.
Option B could align with immediate interests, although the central issue would be based on the viability of continuing to reward projects that do not generate sufficient value, and where the “liabilities exceed assets”. dApp Staking now deserves a conventional basic accounting solution. An ecosystem cannot be sustained where, I repeat, the liabilities exceed the assets. The community council must plan new ways to combat inefficiencies and ensure that both dApp Staking and other subsidies reach a safe harbor; otherwise, we will continue in free fall.
As for option B, simplicity will always be convenient. We will just have to make the necessary corrections while the situation is resolved.