Astar Foundation Forward: Tokenomics & dApp Staking discussion

Astar
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Hey Astar community,

As part of our ongoing Astar Foundation Forward initiative, we want to open an honest conversation about two topics that directly impact the future of our ecosystem: Tokenomics and dApp Staking.

We’ve been listening to your feedback, reviewing data, and having internal discussions. Now it’s time to bring this conversation to you, because the decisions we make here will shape Astar’s path forward, and we believe you should be part of it.

I. Tokenomics 3.0: We’re Listening

First, let’s clarify the current state of Astar’s tokenomics.

Under Tokenomics 2.0, Astar introduced a dynamic inflation model that adjusts based on network participation, delivering positive results: inflation has decreased from the original ~10% to approximately 2.58% today.

Building on this progress, we’re actively working toward Tokenomics 3.0, which explores mechanisms like a decay factor to further reduce inflation over time. Rather than announcing changes, we want to open the discussion: What else should we consider? What concerns or improvements do you see in the current model?

Share your thoughts in this thread. We’re listening.

II. dApp Staking: Time for an Honest Conversation

dApp Staking has been one of Astar’s defining features since the beginning. The idea was simple and powerful: let token holders support developers directly through staking, creating sustainable funding without relying on grants or token sales.

But let’s be honest with ourselves, the current system isn’t working as intended.

2.1 Where We Are Today

dApp Staking v3, launched in February 2024, introduced significant complexity: separated locking and staking operations, a four-tier system, bonus rewards tied to voting periods, periodic stake resets, and dynamic thresholds.

Here’s what the data and community feedback tell us:

  • The tier system isn’t achieving its goals. Not many projects have ever reached Tier 1 since v3 launched. The threshold (+300 million ASTR) is simply unachievable. Meanwhile, Tier 4 has been described by community members as “basically worthless,” receiving only 3% of rewards while housing 20% of projects.
  • The freerider problem persists. Projects can register and receive rewards without demonstrating meaningful contribution to the ecosystem. We still see dormant dApps, zombie projects, and applications that aren’t genuinely committed to building on Astar.
  • User behavior hasn’t changed. While we introduced additional mechanisms to better align incentives, including bonus rewards, voting periods, and stake resets, most users still operate in a “stake and forget” mode.
  • Developers feel abandoned. We’ve heard from builders who say v3 left them earning 50% less than expected. Some have told us they can no longer sustain development because rewards became unpredictable.
  • The complexity creates friction. The two-step lock-then-stake process, the ~11-day voting periods with no rewards, the periodic resets requiring re-staking, all of this adds friction without clear benefit.

2.2 The Core Question

We need to ask ourselves: Is the current dApp Staking model serving our ecosystem, or has it become a burden?

The original vision was great, developers earning sustainable income directly from network participation. But the execution has struggled across three versions to solve fundamental problems: How do we ensure rewards go to projects genuinely building value? How do we prevent gaming and freeriding? How do we keep things simple enough that users actually engage?

We believe it’s time for bold action. Not incremental parameter tweaks, we’ve tried those. Structural change.

III. Two Paths Forward

We’re presenting two exploratory ideas to help frame a broader community discussion. These are not decisions, not commitments, and not final proposals, but illustrative directions meant to spark conversation.

They are not the only possibilities, nor do they represent a chosen path. Our goal is to gather honest feedback, surface concerns, and better understand how the community thinks about the future of this topic.

Plan A: Return to dApp Staking v2 Principles

What it means: Strip away v3’s complexity and return to the simple, straightforward model that dApp Staking started with, but with lessons learned.

How it would work: No tiers. No bonus rewards. No voting periods. No stake resets. Users lock tokens and nominate them to dApps of their choice. Rewards flow continuously to both stakers and developers based on stake amount. Simple era-based rewards that users can claim without navigating complex periods or eligibility rules.

The version number 2 operated on a clear premise: stake on projects you believe in, everyone earns proportionally. It had problems, the freerider issue, the 80/20 split that over-rewarded developers, but its simplicity was also its strength.

A modernized v2 approach would:

  • Rebalance the reward split to address the concerns that led to v2/v3 changes (potentially 50/50 or adjusted based on community input)
  • Implement strict listing criteria and active curation by ACC to prevent freeriders from entering the system
  • Maintain continuous rewards without complex periods that confuse users and create dead zones
  • Preserve the “support developers” narrative that differentiates Astar
  • Restore predictability for developers who need to plan around expected income

Why consider this: Maybe v3 was overcorrected. The tier system, bonus rewards, and voting periods were solutions to problems, but they created new problems. Sometimes the answer isn’t more complexity, it’s returning to what worked, fixing what didn’t, and accepting that perfect systems don’t exist.

The v2 model had genuine adoption. Users understood it. Developers could predict their income. Yes, it had flaws, but were those flaws worse than what we have now?

What it would require: Strict governance around which projects can list. Active delisting of non-performers. Clear criteria that projects must meet to receive rewards. The ACC would need expanded authority to curate the registry aggressively.

Plan B: Simplified ASTR Staking

What it means: Remove dApp Staking entirely in its current form. No more tiers, no more bonus rewards, no more voting periods, no more individual dApp nominations. Instead, users stake ASTR on a single unified contract, either the Astar Collective or Community Treasury.

How it would work: Users lock ASTR and earn staking rewards directly. Simple. No complexity, no decisions to make beyond “how much do I want to stake?” The rewards distribution focuses entirely on stakers, eliminating the dApp reward allocation that currently goes to projects regardless of their actual contribution.

Why consider this: The honest truth is that most users already treat dApp Staking as simple staking, they pick a dApp (often randomly or based on APR) and forget about it. The “support developers” narrative hasn’t translated into meaningful curation. Users don’t research projects before staking. They don’t move stake based on development progress. They optimize for yield.

If user behavior is already “stake and forget,” why maintain a complex system pretending otherwise?

This approach would:

  • Reduce inflation by eliminating rewards to dApps that aren’t providing tangible ecosystem value
  • Remove all friction from the staking experience
  • Maintain attractive APR for stakers who want simple yield
  • Eliminate the freerider problem entirely, no more rewards to dormant or uncommitted projects
  • Simplify our narrative, Astar becomes a network where you can stake easily, while developers are funded through focused, merit-based programs

What it would affect: Programs like UCG (Unstoppable Community Grants) that rely on dApp Staking structure would need to be discontinued or redesigned. Infrastructure dApps currently funded through staking would need alternative funding mechanisms. The “Build2Earn” narrative that has been part of Astar’s identity would change fundamentally.

IV. We Need Your Voice

This isn’t a decision we want to make in isolation, both paths represent significant change: one removes a core feature, while the other acknowledges that we may have overcomplicated things and need to step back. We want to hear your thoughts, so please share them below. Let’s figure this out together and keep the discussion going.

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SoneVibe Finances - dApp Staking Application
dApp Staking Model: Criticisms of the old model and new proposals
dApp Staking Model: Criticisms of the old model and new proposals
Astar: From dApp Staking to Astar's Financial Hub
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After years of operation, the answer to Build2Earn is already very clear. If there is something that can be easily profitable, most people will become lazy, and we need radical solutions, so I think Plan 2 is better than Plan 1. Let the foundation control the funds, rather than wasting them in vain.

  1. Reduce the overall inflation of network blockchain
  2. Reward active dapp developers and reduce or even stop the profits of inactive dapps
  3. Reduce users’ staking income and increase their usage of Astor tokens instead of keeping them in their wallets.
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Thank you.
As a matter of fact, I just posted a proposal related to dApp Staking in a different thread. Depending on how things go, it might make more sense to close that one and continue the discussion in this thread instead.

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Adopting point 1 would simply be a step backwards and would change nothing.

What’s needed now is a change of direction, without wasting funds, but rather using them intelligently by the foundation. We must move forward and adopt a different structure than the current or previous one.

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Thank you, @Juminstock , for bringing this topic to the community.

I am strongly in favor of Option 2, with a clear focus on strengthening the treasury and financing a small number of strategically important projects through grants. Given the current stage of the ecosystem, we do not need dozens or hundreds of “winners” — a small set of high-quality, well-aligned projects is more than sufficient.

Under the current constraints, a more effective approach would be to move away from dApp Staking as the primary growth lever and adopt a curated, grant-based strategy focused on top-tier teams.

A well-designed grants program would allow Astar to:

  • Allocate capital intentionally rather than passively;

  • Attract teams with proven traction and clear product-market fit;

  • Define clear milestones, accountability, and KPIs;

  • Reduce reputational and governance risk;

  • Deploy treasury resources where they generate the highest long-term ecosystem value.

In short, transitioning from permissionless hope to intentional capital allocation may be a necessary step for the next phase of Astar’s ecosystem growth.

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For me, the biggest problem about dapp staking is that we’re limiting ourselves to the astar network. We built an entire bridge to take us from polkadot to ethereum. Then only incentivize the users on the astar network..
We have 2-3 liquid dapps that can take us to ethereum but it’s 2-3x more difficult to build 2-3 more ecosystems with 2-3x more value.
We should just have 1 native liquid dapp token on ethereum that would simplify our model and give us a better reputation.
Then if nobody is moving their assets to ethereum. Then we incentivize them with a bit of inflation. Creating real value.
Bad example: We say that we’re going to sell 1m of ASTR a day on uniswap ethereum (with inflation). That would create a market of incentive for people to stake ETH/ASTR to buy up cheaper ASTR.

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Well, I’m glad you opened this thread – one started by you definitely gets much more visibility. At this point, we could merge the other two or just close them permanently. I invite anyone who hasn’t already done so to read the comments on the topic; there might be some interesting feedback…As for this thread in particular, I’m going with option 2. Not because the first one is wrong, but because I see it as less forward-looking, and besides, it wouldn’t help us get out of the current stagnant situation in any way…I’ll avoid repeating the same things I’ve already written in the other two open threads so as not to be repetitive.

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Option B for me.

Delist every single project currently listed for dApp staking and have them apply through the ACC directly for re-listing.

Love the proposal and glad everyone seems to be leaning towards option B.

dApp staking in its current format isn’t a failure - it was an innovative approach, we learned valuable data points and now we can implement a more robust system going forward.

Would like to see performance-based grants (like the one Sfy earned) also become the norm

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Personal thoughts on the proposed paths

I understand why these two options are being discussed, but honestly, neither of them fixes the problem at its root.

Going back to dApp Staking v2, even with stricter governance, feels more like returning to something that worked better rather than something that truly works long term. It was simpler, people understood it, and developers could roughly predict revenue. But at the end of the day, it still paid projects mainly for being there. Some delivered real value, others didn’t, and the system wasn’t great at telling the difference.

The simplified ASTR staking option (Plan B) is at least honest. It matches how most users already behave: stake, forget, and collect yield. From a purely economic and UX perspective, it makes sense. The issue is that it turns Astar into something very generic. Efficient, yes — but it removes one of the few things that historically made Astar different.

To me, both paths make the same mistake: they focus on how users choose, when the real issue is how the system pays.

Right now, rewards are mostly distributed before any real proof of value exists. As long as incentives are paid upfront, opportunism will always exist, no matter how simple or complex the system is.

A more realistic alternative

Instead of paying dApps through direct staking, it makes more sense to separate concerns.

Users stake ASTR into a single, simple contract and receive a predictable base APY. No tiers, no bonuses, no complicated decisions. That alone fixes most of the user experience issues.

Developers, on the other hand, don’t receive automatic rewards. They compete for periodic reward pools based on clear, public metrics. Things like real on-chain usage, active users, integration with other projects, completed audits, or infrastructure that actually supports the ecosystem.

No rewards for simply existing. Value has to be demonstrated first.

Governance would focus on adjusting metric weights and pool budgets, not on manually selecting winners. The ACC’s role shifts toward auditing and execution rather than political curation.

Why this works better

This approach solves multiple problems at once:

  • Users get simple, predictable staking

  • Projects stop being paid just for being listed

  • Inflation is directed toward real impact

  • Zombie projects naturally fall out

  • The narrative becomes more honest

The message becomes something closer to:
“On Astar, building isn’t enough. Someone has to use it.”

That might sound harsh, but it’s exactly the kind of discipline many ecosystems are missing.

Final thoughts

v3 tried to fix incentives through complexity and overshot.
v2 was simple, but naive.
Plan B is efficient, but strips away identity.

The real solution may not be going backward or deleting everything, but accepting that staking and developer funding don’t need to be the same mechanism.

If Astar wants to be truly different, it has to stop paying for expectations — and start paying for results.

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Thank you for taking part in the conversation and for proposing your ideas!

This would mean adding more work and responsibility to the Astar Foundation, since what you are proposing would be based on:

  • Receiving the rewards
  • Evaluating the dApps that are part of the program (this is a major effort currently being carried out by the ACC)
  • Distributing rewards based on activity

It might make more sense to create a grant-based model tied to the Astar Collective and its treasuries, where the governance bodies would assume greater responsibilities. What do you think?

I suggest that you bring these valuable points to this thread, as the intention is for it to become the main place for gathering community feedback regarding dApp Staking and part of the tokenomics :handshake:.

In that case, what do you propose? What could we implement while considering both sides of the coin: stakers and dApp rewards? How could we carry it out?

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This approach would provide more value to the Astar Collective treasuries, so it sounds reasonable to me.

It would increase the responsibilities of the governance bodies, which would become actively involved in these allocations.

However, Option B proposes the complete removal of dApp reward allocation. Where would the funds for this grant-based model come from?

I don’t agree with you on this, as this is not an issue with the program’s mechanism but rather with how we distribute it. It makes complete sense for us to focus on Astar, since it is one of the core products of our network.

This sounds interesting, but what implications should we keep in mind on our side, from your point of view?

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That’s exactly what we’ll do once we manage to focus the entire conversation in this thread.

This would be a very interesting filter to evaluate a dApp’s real progress and measure its activity within the ecosystem. It adds more work for the ACC but aligns with the goal of eliminating “ghost” dApps.

It’s important to remember that this thread is intended to concentrate the conversation on dApp Staking and list the pain points identified by the community, so that a corresponding proposal can be developed later. The options presented here are purely ideas for discussion, but feel free to add new ones.

Yes, just as @pitcoin777 suggested above.

This aligns closely with what’s proposed in Plan B. However, it completely excludes dApp reward allocation, which would have a huge impact on dApp Staking behavior. Your proposal mentions creating competition between dApps for reward pools, but wouldn’t this basically be a grant-based program?

From a dApp owner’s perspective, it would make more sense to request retroactive payment for the work and value I’ve delivered to the ecosystem rather than compete for a pool whose benefit for my project is uncertain. But I also understand your perspective that dApps should put more effort into earning their rewards.

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With Option B, staking becomes much simpler. Users will no longer need to care about which project to stake on, which saves them time. They only need to check whether the APR is attractive, similar to other staking systems.
However, this simplicity also removes the original meaning of “dApp Staking.”
Therefore, I suggest adding the following points:

  1. Reward Sharing for Active dApps:
    dApps built on Astar should still receive shared rewards based on their activity and impact in the ecosystem.
    If a dApp is active and attracts users, we can distribute part of the rewards to them according to their progress reports posted on the forum.

  2. Wallet Integration for Easier Staking:
    Collaborate with wallet providers to make staking accessible directly from wallets.
    Most users don’t even know what the Portal is, so enabling direct staking through wallets would be much more convenient and practical.

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@Juminstock
Thank you!
Now, this is long, but I’ll repost what I wrote in another thread. It’s mostly unchanged, but I’ve combined two posts and edited them slightly.

This proposal points in a slightly different direction than the one @Juminstock made.

1. Fundamental question: the sustainability of dApp Staking (developer rewards)

This is the most fundamental point, but we have to ask: “Do we even need dApp Staking?”
Originally, one of Astar’s differentiators was that it natively supported a mechanism to support developers. At the beginning, I think this helped Astar attract a certain number of dApps.

However, the reality is that it has not produced the results we hoped for—many community members have pointed this out. As I wrote yesterday, developer rewards are not a huge portion of actual inflation, but if the effect is weak, we have to consider tightening that inflation further, or even eliminating it.

2. The legitimacy of staker rewards

Staker rewards are still high. Last year’s tokenomics adjustment lowered APR by a few percentage points, but even so, combined with bonuses it exceeds 17%, which is an extremely high return. That return can directly translate into sell pressure. At current ASTR prices, it amounts to roughly $3.1M per year of potential sell pressure.

This isn’t unique to ASTR, but most altcoins have very thin liquidity, so this kind of sell pressure creates a significant downside risk.

Also, in PoS chains, staking typically entails slashing risk and is compensation for participating in consensus. In Astar, however, the reward is essentially compensation for participation via voting in dApp Staking, and there is very little risk. High APR can be important for increasing TVL, but since TVL is currently trending downward, there isn’t much justification for maintaining the current APR.

That said, lowering APR could cause stakers to exit—and that could itself create additional sell pressure.

3. Transition to Tokenomics 3.0

With the proposed ASTR tokenomics changes from last year, ASTR—which previously had no supply cap—is expected to have a cap. The parameters are not finalized yet, but under the initial plan, inflation would decline roughly as follows:

  • Year 0: 4.32%
  • Year 1: 3.50%
  • Year 2: 2.84%
  • Year 5: 1.51%
  • Year 10: 0.53%

image
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Since inflation is scheduled to decrease exponentially, dApp Staking will effectively end sooner or later. Therefore, making a fundamental course correction aligned with the tokenomics change is rational.

4. So what do we do?

Given the above, I believe the appropriate direction is to end dApp Staking and move to a different structure.

A. NPoS / DPoS

The simplest option is to move toward a more typical PoS model: stake to validators (collators, in Astar’s case) and earn yield. However, I’m not convinced this is well-suited for Astar.

In this model, the current developer rewards and staker rewards would be allocated to collators, and stakers would receive yield net of collator commissions.

To be honest, this approach isn’t very interesting—and given parachain/Astar characteristics, it may not make much sense. It could look like a forced mechanism created purely to offer yield.

B. A more suitable new model

Because the legitimacy of NPoS/DPoS on Astar seems weak, I’ve considered a structure that may be better aligned.

First, define inflation allocation roughly as follows (parameters are provisional and can be adjusted):

  • Treasury: 18%
    → Merge dApp rewards into the treasury and move to direct grants
  • Collators: 3.2%
    → Given inflation decline and running costs, this might even be increased vs before
  • Base Staker Rewards: 10%
  • Adjustable Staker Rewards: max 40%
    → Reduced from before
  • Staker Governance Rewards: 28.8%
    → Distribute rewards to those who stake and participate in governance voting

In this pattern, dApp Staking is fully ended and we move to simple staking. The current dApp Staking page could be replaced with a delegation page. It would be even better if it could integrate with Subsquare.

This emphasizes governance participation by reallocating what used to be Bonus Rewards and part of Adjustable Staker Rewards into rewards for governance participants.

Staker Governance Rewards would be calculated periodically (monthly, perhaps). Since Astar currently uses Conviction Voting, the voting power used during that period can be treated as the share ratio for reward distribution. If someone boosts voting power to receive more rewards, their lock period becomes longer—so unless they truly have conviction in ASTR, that behavior isn’t rational.

If we wanted to add more “game elements” to governance, we could consider rewarding voters who chose the ultimately winning option more heavily (or even making it 100:0). But that could distort governance. On the other hand, without any incentive structure, people may vote without thinking. There are trade-offs here and it deserves careful discussion. In any case, once governance has rewards attached, some degree of distortion is inevitable, so if we go this route, we need to design it in a way that minimizes that distortion as much as possible.

If there are no governance votes during a given calculation period, we simply shouldn’t mint those rewards. Since reward ASTR is not minted until distribution timing anyway, there’s no need to burn it. The downside is that if governance doesn’t occur with some frequency, it could further reduce engagement.

As it stands, we still can’t prevent a “stake and forget” behavior. To address this, it might be appropriate to introduce a mechanism where staking rewards are reduced if a user does not participate in governance voting for a certain period, or alternatively, to allocate a larger portion of staking rewards to governance participation rewards.

There is also a risk that delegation becomes the dominant behavior and people stop voting themselves. That said, this may simply mean that those who wouldn’t vote anyway end up delegating.
If we want to add a deterrent to delegation—essentially to encourage direct voting—we could also consider adding a commission to delegation.

Also, under this pattern, UCG would be ended and replaced with direct grants only. Projects applying to ACC would undergo pre-screening and then proceed under governance.

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Although this thread is primarily about dApp Staking and Tokenomics, Tokenomics itself has hardly been discussed so far, so I’d like to make a proposal on that as well.

Under Tokenomics 3.0, a maximum supply is planned, and the amount of ASTR issued per block is expected to decrease over time.

What if we add one additional “coefficient” on top of this?

At a fundamental level, the price of an asset fluctuates based on the balance between supply and demand. In simple terms, the reason ASTR’s price has continued to decline is that supply exceeds demand. Here, we can think of supply as inflation and demand as buyers.

This applies to the tokens of most projects: because issuance ignores the supply–demand balance, oversupply becomes the norm and prices collapse. That said, having someone arbitrarily adjust token issuance runs strongly counter to the ethos of this industry.

What I therefore propose is a mechanism that autonomously reduces the inflation rate by evaluating demand conditions based on on-chain metrics. This is what I referred to earlier as the “one coefficient.” For convenience, let’s call it the Demand Factor (DF).

The calculation itself is simple:

  1. Evaluate demand over a fixed period and calculate DF (MAX = 1).
  2. Use the Tokenomics 3.0 inflation rate as the maximum, and if a certain level of demand is not met, reduce issuance accordingly (Inflation rate × DF).

The most important part is how DF is calculated. The following on-chain indicators seem suitable:

  • Transaction volume
  • Gas fees spent
  • Staked amount

Regarding staked amount, it may be better not to use it, since it would overlap with the dynamic staking rewards portion of the current inflation allocation.

By using the first two indicators and evaluating how demand changes over a given period, the inflation rate can be adjusted dynamically.

Below is an example calculation:

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I downloaded one year of parameters from Subscan and applied them to an actual calculation.

  • Evaluate changes in transaction volume and gas fees month-over-month
  • Smooth volatility using a square root
  • Multiply the combined evaluation value (Total Evaluation) by the previous month’s DF
  • Then multiply DF by the inflation rate
  • Use the Tokenomics 3.0 inflation rate as the base

This calculation is presented purely as an example, so there is plenty of room for discussion around the parameters. For instance, we could use longer-term averages to smooth changes further, or adjust the weighting between transactions and gas fees. The starting value is set to 1 here, but it could also start from a lower value.

The goal of this proposal is not to define every detail, but rather to fundamentally rethink how the inflation rate itself is determined.

So far, inflation adjustments have mainly been considered in terms of staking ratios. However, staking does not necessarily represent real demand and largely ignores actual activity. This approach, by contrast, places emphasis on real on-chain activity and introduces a different way of modulating inflation.
Moreover, if stakers want to maximize their returns, they would need to help increase on-chain activity, which rationalizes cooperation that reflects the growth of the ecosystem.

That said, this would clearly be a complex mechanism, and there are likely practical challenges on the implementation side. I’m not a developer, so I’ve intentionally set those concerns aside for now.

First, I’d like to hear what people think about this kind of approach. After that, we can consider the feasibility of implementation.
(Depending on how the discussion goes, this topic might also deserve its own separate thread.)

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Hello everyone, I’m Amil, founder of @Sonevibe.

First, I want to sincerely thank the Astar Foundation and @Maarten for opening this Pandora’s box. It takes courage to admit when something isn’t working. The honesty in this post is refreshing and exactly the kind of transparency we need to move forward.

As an active builder in the ecosystem, I’ve experienced the transition to v3 firsthand. The diagnosis is spot on: v3 felt like over-engineering. The complexity of voting periods, resets, and the tier system created unnecessary friction for users and lethal financial uncertainty for developers. Instead of encouraging participation, it generated fatigue.

However, regarding the two proposed paths, my stance is firm:

Why “Plan B” (Eliminating dApp Staking) is a strategic mistake
dApp Staking is the soul of Astar. It’s our “Unique Value Proposition” (UVP) in a sea of generic L1s and L2s. If we eliminate dApp Staking to become a standard PoS chain, we lose our identity and our most powerful tool for attracting talent.
The problem isn’t the “Build2Earn” concept—it’s the execution and the lack of filters.

The way forward: An Evolved “Plan A” (Simplicity + Meritocracy)
I fully support returning to the simplicity of v2, but we can’t go back to the past without applying the lessons learned. We need a Plan A 2.0 that combines ease of use for holders with maximum demands for builders.

Here is my concrete proposal for this revamp:

  1. Radical Simplicity for the User (UX First)
    Let’s go back to basics: Lock → Nominate → Earn.
    Eliminate voting periods, complex bonuses, and artificial tiers. The average user wants to stake and support the ecosystem without managing their position every 10 days. Easier UX will increase the percentage of locked ASTR, reducing selling pressure.

  2. Strict and Aggressive Curation (The end of Freeriders)
    If we simplify staking (“Stake and Forget”), quality responsibility falls on curation. The Astar Community Council (ACC) and Foundation must have expanded authority to:

  • Establish tough entry criteria (mandatory functional MVP, audits, team verification).
  • Execute active delistings of zombie projects or those that haven’t delivered updates in X months.
  • dApp Staking should be a privilege for those who add value, not a universal right.
  1. Hybrid Incentives: Base + On-Chain Metrics
    To address reward disparities, I propose a hybrid model:
  • Base Reward: Proportional to nominated stake (holder democracy).
  • Performance Boost: An automatic multiplier (for example 1.2x-2x) based on real on-chain metrics (Transaction volume, UAW, Gas consumed).
    This aligns incentives: if you build something people actually use, you earn more. If you only do marketing but no one uses your dApp, you earn the minimum (or get delisted).
  1. Alignment with Tokenomics 3.0
    With the supply cap and decay factor coming, we can afford to keep dApp Staking. We can start with an adjustable reward split (for example 60% Stakers / 40% Devs) to keep APR attractive for holders while the token price stabilizes, then fine-tune via governance as the network matures.

Conclusion
Let’s not kill the feature that makes Astar special. Let’s fix it.
I invite the community and fellow builders to reject the defeatism of Plan B and work together on an optimized v2 model: no friction for users, no mercy for freeriders.

Let’s keep building.

Amil | Founder @Sonevibe

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18

Thank you.

I still remember how excited I was about the original, revolutionary concept of dApp Staking. However, if the system is no longer delivering what we initially expected, then it’s understandable that we need to reconsider it.

In my view, while dApp Staking itself may need to come to an end for now, I would still like to see a mechanism for “supporting developers” continue. In that sense, my position is closer to Plan B. A redesign of UCG would likely be necessary.

As for ideas to reduce inflation, I can only think of the common approaches that have probably already been discussed. I assume several options are already being considered, but perhaps combining multiple measures could be effective.

This may be a simplistic thought, but if we think of reducing inflation as reducing circulating supply, could the Astar Foundation design some kind of GameFi initiative? By tying “staking” to an enjoyable game experience, we might encourage users to keep holding tokens simply because it’s fun.

For example, in an RPG-style system, equipping a character with items (like a dagger NFT) whose abilities scale with the amount of tokens held could motivate players to maintain larger token balances in order to keep upgrading. (The example itself is quite common, but you get the idea.)

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As I said before, I think adopting point 1 would be a step backwards, and we would continue to distribute resources to many projects that don’t add value to Astar. By “change of direction” and “without wasting funds but using them intelligently by the foundation,” I mean adopting point 2 and taking a similar approach as we’re doing with Comet (the new DEX about to launch with the support of the Astar Foundation), meaning having fewer projects, but those we do have would be rigorously selected and more selective. On the staker side, nothing would change, because, as I’ve repeated, they’re interested in the % return on the ASTRs staked, and often the allocation is made randomly without considering which dApp the ASTRs are being allocated to (I’ve read this from several community members). The only change would be on the developer side, because projects are being funded in a targeted and more selective manner = Quality > Quantity.

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Main treasury and Community treasury which will stake one the single contract as well and get the rewards as "stakers”… we can figure out a way (aligned with AFC efforts) to make thee treasury more efficient and use the funds to boost the Grants approach.

In this way the UCG Program would be gone.

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I largely agree with the idea that the real problem is not the existence of incentive flows, but how widely and inefficiently they’ve been distributed. dApp Staking created a lot of surface area, but most of that surface wasn’t generating actual usage or retention just passive extraction.

If we remove the UCG-style entitlement layer and shift toward curated, milestone-based grants + ecosystem partnerships, we can do more with less. A smaller set of teams that are vetted, aligned, and accountable is better than dozens of idle receivers. Comet seems like the right direction: funded, supported, and expected to ship.

From the staker side, nothing breaks: users care about predictable returns, not which dApp they nominate. Moving rewards through a single contract + treasury staking simplifies UX and preserves yield without forcing users into governance chores they don’t care about.

To me, this is the middle ground:

  • Keep economic incentives, but stop auto-funding everyone

  • Make the foundation’s capital allocation strategic, not egalitarian

  • Measure success by usage and ecosystem growth, not the number of dApps in the program

In short: quality > quantity, accountability > entitlement — that’s how you attract serious builders without burning inflation on spectators.

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