I think for a project being in Tier 3 or Tier 4 is quite significant. In our case it seems the increase of the threshold by only a few percent moved us down one Tier and that is of course a big difference in terms of being able to have dedicated people working on a dapp or not
Tier thresholds are set to change dynamically by the system.
Briefly, there are two things involved
The price of ASTR
The number of ASTR issued
As the price of ASTR decreases, the number of slots in the Tier decreases and the threshold increases. In return, the ASTRs rewarded per slot will increase. In addition, the threshold is a fixed percentage range relative to the number of ASTRs issued, and changes dynamically within that range.
You can check previous messages for the details on threshold amount calculations, but here’s a brief TL;DR:
Before: Threshold amounts were calculated based on fixed TVL (Total Value Locked) amounts.
After: The calculation now uses total issuance PERCENTAGES, making it more dynamic and adaptable (e.g., in response to token burns).
These values are not set via governance; they were determined based on the total issuance at the launch of dApp Staking v3 and applied during the latest v5.43.0 runtime upgrade. The method for calculating the number of slots and the amount of rewards distributed remains unchanged.
I’m sorry to hear about the tier downgrade your project experienced. However, the threshold amounts for T2 and T3 on Astar are actually lower now compared to before:
Before:
T2 threshold: 70.981M ASTR // T2 min threshold: 50M ASTR
T3 threshold: 18.928M ASTR // T3 min threshold: 15M ASTR
Now:
T2 threshold: 69.910M ASTR // T2 min threshold: 49.246M ASTR
T3 threshold: 18.427M ASTR // T3 min threshold: 14.691M ASTR
There has been a 15.6% increase in the T4 threshold:
Before:
T4 threshold: 1.419M ASTR
Now:
T4 threshold: 1.641M ASTR
Feel free to reach out if you have any more questions or need further clarification!
I am wondering about the usefulness of bonus for stakers in dAppStaking. I think it is mainly to encourage users to stake during the voting subperiod and therefore to ask dApps to do promotion to attract as many stakers as possible.
With feedback and the numbers, do you think it works?
For my part, I have no opinion on it, that’s why I am asking the question directly here.
However, I see two negative points.
The first, the user is not free to move his stake during the BuildAndEarn subperiod, if he does, he loses his bonus. It is therefore difficult to arbitrate especially with the dynamic thresholds (this point has also been raised by the community).
The other negative point is inflation. I think that the basic staking APR (currently 13%) is sufficient and that it is not necessary to have an additional bonus. I agree that this base rate will decrease if the number of stakers increases.
Finally, why not remove the bonus?
There would be less inflation, more flexibility for the user, and I think it would simplify the implementation of liquid staking solutions.
I think their’s deffinitly an issue with threshold calculation as per documention (number_of_slots Astar =floor(1000∗ASTR USD +50), number of slot should be 107-108 (regarding if you round up or down) @0.0579$/ASTR
However there is only 104 slote ATM which push up T2 threashold by about 2M and T3 by 0.5M
can you check that?
The current moving average Astar USD price is 0.054191, and therefore 104 slots. There is nothing wrong with the calculation. How did you determine your Astar USD price?
Thank you for your detailed message; it’s much appreciated.
We recognize that the current bonus setup may not be optimal (the first point in particular), and we’ll be discussing with the team to explore potential improvements.
Look like my moving average calculation was off (i do not have access to a record of prices for passed 7 days and had to pics few arbitrarly).
Do you know where i can have access to exportable free data of Astar price ?
EDIT: The numbers might be confusing, but it’s the fixed-point notation. Each of the number should be divided by 10^18 to get the usual human-readable representation.
E.g. the value 52,029,643,949,191,846 in the circular buffer is actually ~0.052 $.
We’ve been discussing it in the team and have rough idea how to do this.
The problem is that the team is stretched very thing right now so I cannot give you a time estimate.
My personal wish would be to have this by the end of year.
But maybe I’m too optimistic.
Hi @Dino
thx for the reply.
Could you elaborate a bit on the rough idea the team and you have though about?
maybe we can had it our 10 cents to make it even better for everyone
the system exists so the staking choice carries some weight
it also provides a certain safety for the dApps since stakers aren’t encouraged to change their choice during the Build&Earn subperiod
the first two points are still valid and must be kept in mind
if a staker decides to change who they stake on, it shouldn’t be punished in any way since if it is, then it’s highly unlikely anyone will do it (e.g. why forfeit 50% of the bonus reward just to change who you stake on?)
the solution will most likely be an introduction of a new call which can transfer stake from one dApp to another without forfeiting the bonus
this action will be limited - e.g. you can only call it once per period or per stake
I would strongly suggest to offer the possibility to switch each stack once per X days during B2E period in order to keep the staking flexible enough to offer temporary support to a dApp in need of it during, for instance, difficults market conditions .
As we must keep in mind that 4 months is freaking long in crypto and that dynamic system mainly based on Astr token price, I would suggest 25 to 30 days max in order to offer enough flexibility to react to 2 crisis during a B2E period without creating propice condition to “bonus war” or lowering the weight of decision.
Your suggestion doesn’t really account for this as far as I can see.
Yes, it’s a long period in crypto.
But it’s very “short” in terms of development - hence the comment about safety. Devs should be able to count on some level of support for at least a few months.
I’m not sure I get why ASTR price is important for being able to move stake though?
One thing I forgot to mention - we’ll allow switching of stake from an unregistered dApp normally, without any limitations.
I would indeed provide a certain safety for dApp if thresholds were not dynamic AND set based on 7 days average ASTR price.
How many dApp lost their Tier last season because threshold did not stop to increase due to ASTR price falling and stakers were then stuck as they would be penalized by moving their stake.
IMO this risk is far higher than stakers stopping to support them during B2E for no specific reason.
Unless a dApp start increasing dramatically its incencitive to stakers during a B2E period (initiate a reward war), it is expected that stakers will continu to support their favorit dApp for its project while overlooking the small incencitive difference.
However, reward war, either during voting period or B2E period should be discouraged by all mean (I must admit that i don’t know how)…
Furthermore, we should keep in mind that switching dApp mid B2E can also serve as a sanction for a dApp who fail to honnor a promize or show bad behevior to its community. In this senario, staker should be allowed to move away without penalty and also have the possibility to come back within the same B2E period if the faulty dApp rectified the situation.
On the other hand, if a staker see that one of his favorit dApp is in danger of dropping from its current Tier due to threshold increase (cause of astr price dropping or a big staker move its stake), he can transfert some of his asset from another dApp which still has a consequente margin over its own Tier threshold (and thus stay safe despite the reduced support).
Unless they are there only for the money - in this case i believe those stakers will stake right from the start on the dApp with the highest incencitive and won’t move their stake even if other dApp are in trouble - regular stakers will do this arbitrage in order to support as many of their favorit dApp as possible while trying to not arm any of them. This scenario could occure more than once during a 4 months timeframe.
regarding this comment :
take for instance T2 threshold.
This graphic has been produced base on Igor spreedsheet - using only 7 days avg Astr price as variable as i do not understand ATM how token emission is driven - and represent threshold value in M $ASTR vs ASTR price in $.
As you can see, Astr price as a significant impact on threshold value
As you mentioned, stakers need to vote with caution, understanding that they’re participating in a form of governance. So, having too much flexibility or frequent changes in staking choices might not be ideal.
However, I’m not sure about the focus on dApps’ safety in this context. Currently, dApp Staking feels more like a reward for performance rather than genuine support (especially since Tier 4, which should arguably need the most support, receives very low rewards). Therefore, I don’t see a strong need to restrict voting flexibility solely for the benefit of dApps.
Personally, I think the current one-period duration is too long. Reducing it by at least half and allowing one penalty-free change in staking destination might be more appropriate. The lengthy period could lead to disengagement among stakers—simply put, many people might forget to engage because the period is so extended.