I would indeed provide a certain safety for dApp if thresholds were not dynamic AND set based on 7 days average ASTR price.
How many dApp lost their Tier last season because threshold did not stop to increase due to ASTR price falling and stakers were then stuck as they would be penalized by moving their stake.
IMO this risk is far higher than stakers stopping to support them during B2E for no specific reason.
Unless a dApp start increasing dramatically its incencitive to stakers during a B2E period (initiate a reward war), it is expected that stakers will continu to support their favorit dApp for its project while overlooking the small incencitive difference.
However, reward war, either during voting period or B2E period should be discouraged by all mean (I must admit that i don’t know how)…
Furthermore, we should keep in mind that switching dApp mid B2E can also serve as a sanction for a dApp who fail to honnor a promize or show bad behevior to its community. In this senario, staker should be allowed to move away without penalty and also have the possibility to come back within the same B2E period if the faulty dApp rectified the situation.
On the other hand, if a staker see that one of his favorit dApp is in danger of dropping from its current Tier due to threshold increase (cause of astr price dropping or a big staker move its stake), he can transfert some of his asset from another dApp which still has a consequente margin over its own Tier threshold (and thus stay safe despite the reduced support).
Unless they are there only for the money - in this case i believe those stakers will stake right from the start on the dApp with the highest incencitive and won’t move their stake even if other dApp are in trouble - regular stakers will do this arbitrage in order to support as many of their favorit dApp as possible while trying to not arm any of them. This scenario could occure more than once during a 4 months timeframe.
regarding this comment :
take for instance T2 threshold.
This graphic has been produced base on Igor spreedsheet - using only 7 days avg Astr price as variable as i do not understand ATM how token emission is driven - and represent threshold value in M $ASTR vs ASTR price in $.
As you can see, Astr price as a significant impact on threshold value
As you mentioned, stakers need to vote with caution, understanding that they’re participating in a form of governance. So, having too much flexibility or frequent changes in staking choices might not be ideal.
However, I’m not sure about the focus on dApps’ safety in this context. Currently, dApp Staking feels more like a reward for performance rather than genuine support (especially since Tier 4, which should arguably need the most support, receives very low rewards). Therefore, I don’t see a strong need to restrict voting flexibility solely for the benefit of dApps.
Personally, I think the current one-period duration is too long. Reducing it by at least half and allowing one penalty-free change in staking destination might be more appropriate. The lengthy period could lead to disengagement among stakers—simply put, many people might forget to engage because the period is so extended.
I see, I think we misunderstood each other.
My comment was aimed at it not being important for the staker.
For the solutions suggested by Igor and me, please check the linked Github issue.
The users will be able to move their stake more than once per period.
Dynamic thresholds help the system respond to market changes, but they can also create uncertainty for stakers and dApps.
Using a 7-day average for thresholds could offer more stability, especially during ASTR price drops.
This way, dApps are less likely to lose their Tier suddenly, and stakers can keep supporting their favorite dApps without facing penalties for quick shifts.
I’m not sure I get why ASTR price is important for being able to move stake though?
I believe that the comment made refers to the fact that sometimes we make choices for dapps, but right after the voting period, certain dapps disappear and do not produce what was agreed.
It doesn’t just look like it, it has been. This becomes clear daily, today we have strong engagement with a specific dapp and little is seen about the others, many are not concerned about this drain of capital via dapp staking, no questions, no real delivery of products.
As for the dApps that will be listed, there will still need to be an organization to manage them.
This was mentioned in a previous post by Marlten and is expected to be improved in the future.
I also think that the compensation aspect should be adjusted at the same time: if certain controls are put in place by the DAO Collective, I would be willing to reduce the number of slots and increase the rewards, especially for Tier 4.
