Astar Foundation Forward: Collective Commitment to Sustainable Growth

[Juminstock]

Hello, Astar Collective!

As part of our ongoing Astar Foundation Forward initiative, we want to open a conversation about how governance bodies can further align with our shared mission.

Throughout this initiative, we have focused on transparency, optimization, and collective action. We have discussed dApp Staking improvements, Ambassador Fellowship refinements, and operational efficiencies. Today, we bring forward another opportunity for alignment: governance compensation.

This proposal was developed in collaboration with the Astar Finance Committee (AFC) and the Astar Community Council (ACC), reflecting input from governance bodies directly involved in ecosystem stewardship.

This discussion is not about reducing anyone’s value or questioning anyone’s commitment. It is about demonstrating, as a unified Astar Collective, that we stand together in supporting the ecosystem’s long-term health.

I. The Opportunity: Aligned Contribution

The Astar Collective represents the backbone of our governance, including four essential bodies:

• Astar Ambassador Fellowship (AAF): Community leaders driving content creation, engagement, events, ecosystem promotion, and community management
• Astar Community Council (ACC): Responsible for managing the Community Treasury, overseeing dApp Staking, and the AAF
• Astar Finance Committee (AFC): Financial stewardship managing treasury operations and resource allocation
• Astar Technical Committee (ATC): Technical team responsible for leading the review, maintenance, and implementation of matters related to the core of the Astar protocol

Each body plays an essential role in Astar’s growth, and that importance will not change.

1.1. What We Are Proposing

In collaboration with the AFC and ACC, this proposal introduces two aligned changes to governance compensation:

• First, a shift from USD-based to ASTR-based compensation. Rather than calculating compensation in USD and converting at fluctuating market prices, we propose fixing compensation amounts in ASTR using a reference price. This creates predictability for contributors and reduces the need to distribute larger token quantities when market prices are low.
• Second, quarterly collective decision-making on distribution timing. At the end of each quarter, ASTR holders participate in a referendum to determine whether compensation should be distributed or carried forward to the next period.

Together, these changes accomplish three important objectives:

• Resource Preservation: Fixed ASTR amounts with a stable reference price preserve ecosystem resources and avoid unnecessary pressure on token supply
• Unified Commitment: Governance contributors demonstrate solidarity with the broader community by accepting compensation in ASTR and allowing distribution timing to reflect ecosystem conditions
• Collective Decision-Making: The Astar Collective, not a single governing body, determines the appropriate timing for compensation distribution

II. Compensation Structure: ASTR-Based Model

This proposal, developed jointly by the AFC and ACC, moves governance compensation from USD-based calculations to fixed ASTR amounts using a reference price.

2.1. Reference Price

We propose using a reference ASTR price of $0.05 for calculating quarterly compensation amounts.

Why $0.05? The reference price serves as more than a calculation tool. It acts as a signal of confidence in ASTR’s value and provides an anchor point for the ecosystem. The proposed $0.05 balances two considerations: it is higher than current market conditions, reflecting belief in ASTR’s potential, while remaining realistic and credible as a reference point.

How it works: The reference price and ASTR compensation amounts are fixed and do not fluctuate with market prices. This creates a balanced mechanism:

• When the market price is below the reference price, the treasury distributes fewer tokens than it would under a USD-based system, preserving ecosystem resources
• When the market price rises above the reference price, contributors benefit from holding ASTR, rewarding their commitment to the ecosystem

Can the reference price change? Yes. The $0.05 reference price is a proposal, not a permanent value. If ecosystem conditions evolve and the community determines an adjustment is warranted, the reference price can be modified through a public referendum using Remark. This ensures the compensation framework remains adaptable while maintaining collective governance over any changes.

This reference price is open for community discussion and may be adjusted based on feedback.

2.2. Quarterly Compensation Amounts

Based on the proposed reference price, the following ASTR compensation amounts would apply:

Astar Community Council (ACC)

• Full Members: 48,000 ASTR per quarter per member (4 members)

Astar Finance Committee (AFC)

• Full Members: 48,000 ASTR per quarter per member (5 members)
• Observer: 18,000 ASTR per quarter per member (1 member)

Astar Ambassador Fellowship (AAF)

• Head Ambassadors (0 members):
  • Base Compensation: 25,000 ASTR per quarter per ambassador
  • Performance Bonus: Up to 5,000 ASTR based on individual performance
• Mid Ambassadors (10):
  • Base Compensation: 16,000 ASTR per quarter per ambassador
  • Performance Bonus: Up to 4,000 ASTR based on individual performance
• Ambassadors (0):
  • Base Compensation: 8,000 ASTR per quarter per ambassador
  • Performance Bonus: Up to 2,000 ASTR based on individual performance

2.3. Understanding Ambassador Compensation

• Compensation philosophy: Ambassador compensation is structured as a recognition reward for commitment and contribution to the ecosystem, not as a salary. This distinction is important: ambassadors participate because they believe in Astar’s mission
• Adjusted base amounts: As part of the Astar Foundation Forward initiative, ambassador base compensation was adjusted from the previous USD equivalent to better align with current ecosystem priorities, calculated at the $0.05 reference price.
• Contribution model: Unlike ACC and AFC members who hold defined governance seats with specific oversight responsibilities, ambassadors operate in a more flexible contribution model. This structural difference is reflected in the compensation framework.

2.4. Benefits of ASTR-Based Compensation

• Predictability: Contributors know exactly how much ASTR they will receive each quarter, enabling better planning and commitment
• Alignment: Compensation value is directly tied to ASTR performance, creating shared interest in ecosystem success
• Sustainability: Fixed ASTR amounts prevent escalating token distributions during low market conditions
• Contributor Commitment: ASTR-based compensation naturally attracts and retains contributors who believe in the project’s long-term vision, strengthening the quality of governance participation
• Reduced Sell Pressure: Contributors receiving ASTR compensation are more likely to hold tokens with a longer-term perspective, reducing immediate market sell pressure

III. How It Works: Governance Process

This proposal introduces a transparent, community-driven process for compensation distribution decisions.

3.1. Quarterly Referendum

At the end of each quarter, before the next quarter begins, the Main Council initiates a public referendum using a Remark. Every ASTR holder can participate in this vote to decide whether:

• Compensation is distributed: All accumulated compensation is released to governance contributors, including any amounts carried forward from previous periods
• Compensation is carried forward: Compensation earned during the quarter accumulates and is carried forward to the next evaluation period

The carry-forward option lets the ecosystem manage token distribution more strategically, especially during high market activity.

3.2. Role of the Main Council

The Main Council serves as the executor of the collective’s decision, not as the decision-maker:

• Initiates the quarterly referendum process
• Ensures the voting mechanism operates correctly
• Executes the distribution or carry-forward based on the referendum outcome
• Intervenes only if voting integrity is compromised

3.3. Key Principles

• Timing: All earned ASTR accumulates will be distributed when the collective decides.
• Continuous Contribution: Governance bodies continue their essential functions.
• Transparent Communication: Referendum results and subsequent actions are communicated to all governance bodies and the broader community.
• Collective Authority: The power to decide distribution timing rests with ASTR holders.

V. Our Shared Commitment

This proposal, created in collaboration with the AFC and ACC, reflects a commitment to decentralized decision-making and sustainable resource management. Share your thoughts below. Together, we continue building an Astar ecosystem that reflects our collective strength​

[pitcoin777]

I want to share my perspective as a governance participant, speaking carefully from a place of responsibility to the ecosystem and the community.

First, I believe the proposal raises an important and healthy discussion. Governance compensation is always a sensitive topic, but it is also a necessary one. If Astar aims to operate as a mature and sustainable ecosystem, then transparency, alignment, and periodic reassessment of incentives should be expected rather than avoided.

From a principle standpoint, moving compensation toward ASTR creates stronger symbolic and economic alignment between governance contributors and the broader community. It reinforces the idea that contributors succeed when the ecosystem succeeds. This type of alignment is generally positive for long-term cohesion and credibility.

At the same time, there are legitimate considerations that the community should evaluate carefully. Governance roles require consistent availability, accountability, and long-term commitment. Compensation structures should continue to ensure stability, predictability, and fairness for contributors, while also protecting ecosystem sustainability. These objectives are not conflicting, but they require balance.

The introduction of quarterly community decision-making on distribution timing is particularly interesting from a decentralization perspective. Allowing token holders to participate directly reinforces collective ownership.

Regarding the reference price, I understand the intention of creating a confidence anchor and preserving treasury resources. Still, the community should evaluate whether the reference mechanism remains adaptable to market realities over time, and whether clear review mechanisms will ensure the model remains fair and sustainable for both contributors and token holders.

Overall, I see this proposal as part of a broader evolution of governance maturity within Astar. It signals willingness to align incentives, increase transparency, and strengthen community participation. These are positive directions.

I appreciate the effort from everyone involved in bringing this forward, and I encourage the community to participate actively in the discussion.

[tksarah]

Thank you for presenting this proposal in this post.

I fully understand the points that were examined and the updates that were made.
In particular, I strongly agree with the shift to ASTR‑based compensation. As pitcoin already explained very clearly, the expected benefits and effects of this change make a lot of sense to me as well.

I do have one point I would like to clarify regarding the “timing of compensation distribution” mentioned in this post.

I am not entirely sure why ASTR holders need to vote each quarter to decide the timing.
If the compensation amounts are already determined, it seems reasonable that the distribution timing could simply be fixed.
I am not saying that this mechanism is bad — I would just like to understand the background behind introducing this system and what benefits or effects are expected from it.

Additionally, if the timing is to be decided by a vote, I believe it would be better to set a clear deadline for when the vote (“distribute or carry forward”) must be finalized.

[Poggi_Luca]

Thank you @Juminstock for posting this proposal!

As an AFC member, please find below my comments.

⸻

Position on the proposal

I agree with the proposal. At a basic level, it combines two ideas:

1. Introducing the reference-price payment system (ASTR-based compensation), something I had already been trying to push since last year.
2. Availability to suspend payments, with the community deciding when these pauses should happen.

⸻

Reference price: why it matters

I had already suggested in the past that payments should be calculated using a reference price, with an important clause:
• If the market price is below the reference price, the system benefits the treasury.
• If the market price is above the reference price, it benefits the people getting paid.

But for this to work, it’s crucial that if we accept this mechanism, there is a future correspondence—meaning the promise must be honored over time. The whole “trade-off” only makes sense because both sides accept it based on that condition.

Of course, after some time, these numbers could be revisited, but fundamentally the system is built on trust and recognition: if price increase, part of the merit is of people that contributed to that, and build their position in the ecosystem.

⸻

Reference price: my preference

On the reference price itself, I would honestly have set it at $0.10 rather than $0.05, because the reference price also serves as a signal to the community—a kind of anchor. Setting it as high as possible (while still remaining credible) helps create a “magnet price” that the ecosystem can aim toward.

That said, $0.05 is still acceptable.

⸻

Why using a ASTR-based compensation is good for the ecosystem

I think switching payments from a USD-based to an ASTR-based compensationis very positive for the ecosystem.

We’re lucky to have a community where many people contribute because they believe in the project, not just because of their role’s compensation. Those roles should go to those kinds of people.

With this new system, I expect a kind of natural selection:
• The so-called “mercenaries” will leave (people who are only here for short-term pay).
• The people who stay will be those who are working for a future value, not today’s payout.

ASTR-based compensation will create two main effects:

1. Fewer ASTR are spent from treasury, which can have a strong positive short-term impact on price (less ASTR will be sold in the market).
2. Tokens end up in the hands of people with a higher price target, meaning they’re less likely to sell at these low prices (so again the market sell pressure is reduced even further).

⸻

Thoughts on the “payment suspension” option

The payment suspension makes less sense in this case:

1. Because payments are ASTR-based, so they are not affected by ASTR price at the moment of payment (the motivation to postpone those is weaker)
2. The treasury income is measured in ASTR, so the “weight” for the treasury to pay those compensations is the same, independently from the ASTR price.

For these reasons, from the treasury’s perspective, holding a “debt” doesn’t make much sense if the debt is denominated in ASTR.

From my POV, for the treasury keeping a debt toward creditors only makes sense in two scenarios:

1. If, in a given quarter, there are major expenses that must be covered with higher priority, so debt becomes a strategic choice.
2. If, in a given quarter, there is extremely heavy market selling of ASTR, the treasury may choose not to add further sell pressure by postponing the compensations payment.

⸻

Conclusion

So overall, I really like this proposal. It’s essentially the same approach I tried to introduce last year.

I’m also happy about the inclusion of the optional payment suspension, because it gives the treasury more flexibility. Even if it makes less sense in a token-denominated model than in a USD-based one, it’s still good that the treasury has the option to create debt if needed.

Thank you

[SimonB]

Hello everyone;
One aspect I find valuable in this proposal is that it reflects how governance actually works in practice. The work doesn’t stop when markets are volatile or conditions are uncertain — responsibilities and decisions continue. In that context, clarity and predictability in the compensation framework are important not only as incentives, but as a way to support consistent and focused governance over time.

Moving compensation to a clearly defined ASTR-based model goes in that direction. It removes unnecessary complexity, avoids reactive adjustments during volatility, and makes the relationship between contribution and ecosystem health more transparent for everyone involved.

That said, I believe the reference price deserves special attention and careful handling.

With full respect for all governance bodies, any potential adjustment of the anchor price should be approached very deliberately. Ideologically, the current mechanism carries an important meaning: when ASTR trades below the reference price, all governance contributors are contributing under less favorable market conditions — not out of obligation, but out of belief in the project and commitment to its long-term vision. That shared exposure has cultural value, not just economic implications.

When ASTR eventually trades above the reference price, the upside becomes a reward for that conviction, patience, and sustained contribution. This asymmetry matters. It reinforces the idea that commitment during more difficult phases is what earns value during stronger ones.

For this reason, I think any future adjustment of the anchor price should only be considered if ASTR’s market price and broader conditions have clearly moved into a materially higher and more stable range. Frequent or reactive updates would risk weakening the very alignment this mechanism is designed to create.

Another element I appreciate is the fact that the community is directly involved and has real decision-making power. That level of participation is positive and strengthens decentralization in a concrete way.

At the same time, it’s important to recognize that with this model compensation amounts are fixed in ASTR. Because of that, waiting for a “more favorable market moment” becomes less meaningful than in a USD-based system.

Overall, I see this proposal less as a simple compensation update and more as a signal of how governance wants to operate going forward: clearer assumptions, explicit trade-offs, and stronger collective ownership of outcomes. I appreciate the collaborative effort behind it and welcome a thoughtful, open discussion from the community.

[Marroz]

Calling this a “proposal” is an understatement: this thread should be carved in stone.To everyone — no exceptions — in 2026 one single mantra must be burned into our minds, day and night, two rules etched in fire:Protect. Preserve. Advance the value of the ASTR token.Protect the token from any unnecessary dilution.
Preserve its scarcity and long-term potential.
Advance its value toward more realistic and ambitious valuations, through disciplined collective action.Everything else is secondary.For me, whether we decide to distribute, postpone, or carry forward the payouts each quarter is almost irrelevant in the bigger picture.
What truly matters — and what makes this initiative a giant leap forward — is the fundamental shift: fixed ASTR compensation, aligned incentives, community control via referendums, and the clear awareness that every single ASTR paid out is a dilution of everyone’s hard work.These two rules must become the non-negotiable foundation for anyone receiving compensation from the Collective. No more excuses, no more short-term thinking.We have ambitious goals — building a leading ecosystem, real adoption, massive value capture — but in the last year we have sometimes lost sight of them, overwhelmed by old habits and market conditions.This initiative strengthens unity: contributors win only when ASTR wins. Holders win when we stop bleeding supply unnecessarily. The Collective wins when decisions are transparent and decentralized.I am 100% in favor. This isn’t just “good”: it is necessary.Let’s make sure this mindset becomes permanent.Strong YES from me.

[Audiarmis]

@Juminstock

• :estrella::estrella::estrella:Embajadores principales (0 miembros):
• Compensación base: 25.000 ASTR por trimestre por embajador
• Bono por rendimiento: hasta 5000 ASTR según el rendimiento individual
• :estrella::estrella:Embajadores del Medio (10):
• Compensación base: 16.000 ASTR por trimestre por embajador
• Bono por rendimiento: hasta 4000 ASTR según el rendimiento individual
• :estrella:Embajadores (0):
• Compensación base: 8000 ASTR por trimestre por embajador
• Bono por rendimiento: hasta 2000 ASTR según el rendimiento individual

I’m glad I took the time to read this discussion and the different perspectives it has generated
I see it as a logical evolution for incentives to be denominated in ASTR, as this reinforces alignment with the ecosystem and its long-term growth

I agree with what @poggi_luca mentioned about keeping it at $0.10, as that approach carries an aspirational component — almost like a collective bet or a shared manifestation of confidence in Astar
That said, I also understand the reasoning behind establishing it as a standard value within the framework of the proposal.

One of the points that raised the most questions for me is the collective decision around when funds are released
Personally, I believe this type of process could benefit from greater automation ; however, I also understand the logic behind decentralization and the value of allowing the community to actively participate in these decisions

As someone who has not benefited from the treasury, I genuinely hope these changes contribute to strengthening the community and, as a result, to the growth and consolidation of ASTR’s value

[0xMR_IMAN]

This proposal is strategically rational.

It does three things:

1. Shifts compensation from short-term USD logic to long-term ASTR alignment

2. Reduces treasury volatility during weak markets

3. Signals governance maturity

But it also introduces subtle structural risks that people are only half-addressing.

What I Agree With

1. ASTR-based compensation is the correct move.

If governance is paid in USD-equivalent, you create:

• Structural sell pressure in bear markets

• Mercenary participation

• Misalignment with token holders

Paying in ASTR:

• Filters out short-term actors

• Encourages long-term alignment

• Stabilizes treasury mechanics

This is a net positive.

2. The reference price mechanism is psychologically powerful.

Even if economically neutral long-term, it acts as:

• A confidence anchor

• A coordination signal

• A cultural commitment mechanism

The asymmetry matters:

Contributors share downside.

They earn upside later.

That builds social capital inside governance.

Where I’m More Critical

The quarterly “distribute or carry forward” vote

In a USD model, delaying payment makes sense.

In a token-denominated model, it is less economically meaningful.

If compensation is fixed in ASTR:

• Treasury accounting is in ASTR

• Liability is in ASTR

• Market price becomes secondary

Delaying payments mostly affects:

• Market sell pressure timing

• Psychological signaling

It does not change real treasury burden.

And creating rolling debt can become politically messy later.

Reference Price Risks

A reference price only works if:

• It is stable for long periods

• It is not adjusted reactively

• The adjustment process is extremely disciplined

If it becomes politically adjustable every cycle, the credibility collapses.

The anchor must feel strong, not negotiable.

My Strategic View

Startale is clearly moving toward structural specialization:

• Strium → institutional rails

• Soneium → consumer layer

• Governance → ASTR-aligned

This compensation reform fits that trajectory.

It’s a maturity signal.

But governance maturity is not about optics.

It’s about incentive durability.

Suggested Improvements

1. Fix a minimum holding period for governance compensation
   Example: 30–50% must vest or be locked for X months.
   That reinforces long-term alignment stronger than a reference price alone.

2. Clarify strict conditions for payment suspension
   Define objective triggers:

   • Extraordinary treasury expense

   • Exceptional sell pressure metrics
     Avoid subjective quarterly politics.

4. Set a mandatory review window for the reference price
   Example: Only reviewable every 18–24 months.
   Not quarterly. Not emotionally.

5. Add public treasury impact reporting
   Show clearly:

   • ASTR saved vs old USD model

   • Estimated reduction in sell pressure

Transparency builds legitimacy.

Final Conclusion

This proposal is directionally correct.

It aligns governance with token performance.

It reduces structural leakage.

It signals seriousness.

It is not a magic price pump.

It does not create value.

It manages distribution more intelligently.

If execution discipline holds, it strengthens Astar’s governance layer.

If discipline weakens, it becomes another symbolic reform.

Right now, I would support it with tighter structural guardrails.

[EzioRed]

I would like to share my perspective on the current proposal. Overall, I find the Astar Foundation Forward initiative to be a significant step in the right direction for the ecosystem’s long-term health.

First, I highly applaud the efforts to preserve treasury resources. Avoiding the excessive issuance of tokens during low market conditions is a responsible move that protects the value of the protocol and demonstrates a genuine concern for the community and token holders.

Secondly, I am in agreement with the proposed compensation amounts. The structure appears balanced and fair, considering the different levels of responsibility within the ACC, AFC, and AAF.

However, I would like to offer a point for further discussion regarding the Quarterly Referendum process for distributing compensation.

While I understand the intent behind collective decision-making, I find the requirement to vote between immediate distribution or carry-forward to be potentially illogical and overly bureaucratic. Since we are already establishing a fixed ASTR value with a set reference price ($0.05) to de-risk the treasury, adding a mandatory voting layer for every distribution seems like an unnecessary step. This could lead to voter fatigue and create administrative friction for contributors who have already fulfilled their duties for the quarter.

In my view, once the work is performed and the amounts are fixed in ASTR, the distribution should be more streamlined to ensure efficiency within our decentralized framework.

[you425]

Thank you for the proposal!
I am fully in favor of it.

That said, considering the points that have been raised so far, it might make sense to introduce additional criteria regarding the ASTR reference price. For example, if the market price exceeds the reference price, we could include a condition such as: “If the price exceeds the reference price by X% and remains stable for a certain period, the reference price will be reconsidered.” While it may not be necessary to set an upper limit for the reference price, it might make sense to fix a lower bound.

It may not be necessary to define this in great detail, but even if it is not a strict obligation, having some form of reconsideration criteria in place could reduce hesitation when it comes time to review this point.

The reason I believe this should be defined to some extent is that, since rewards are now denominated in ASTR, if the price of ASTR rises significantly, the reward amounts could become excessively large. Of course, that would reflect increased value from contributions, so it is not inherently a bad thing — but too much could also become problematic. For example, we could consider something like: “If the current price reaches 300% of the reference price, the reference price will be adjusted to 200%.” There is no need to decide this immediately, but it seems like something that should be considered at some point.

As for conducting a vote on reward payments, I am in favor of that. I believe it is important to carry out on-chain governance on a regular basis and increase opportunities for participation. In particular, participating in governance related to the compensation of Agents — whom many of us interact with regularly — is simple, easy to understand, and meaningful. From that perspective, I see value in expanding opportunities to participate in governance through initiatives like this.

[Khonsa]

My preference: I strongly favor the proposed model (fixed ASTR amounts + $0.05 reference price + quarterly collective referendum on distribution timing).

After comparing the current (likely USD-based or hybrid) model with the one proposed in the Astar Foundation Forward discussion, I believe the proposed model is significantly more logical, sustainable, and better aligned with the long-term health of the ecosystem. Below are the main reasons:

Key Advantages of the Proposed Model

1. Stronger treasury preservation during bearish / low-price periods
   When ASTR price is below the reference, far fewer tokens are distributed compared to a USD-pegged system. This meaningfully reduces pressure on token supply during difficult market conditions.

2. Genuine incentive alignment
   Contributors’ compensation value becomes directly tied to ASTR’s performance. People who truly believe in the long-term success of Astar are rewarded more if/when the price rises this naturally filters for committed, long-term aligned participants.

3. Very valuable carry-forward mechanism (collective quarterly decision)
   The ability to vote to postpone distribution during high market stress or heavy selling periods is a powerful tool that almost no other project has. It gives the community real control over emission timing and can help prevent coordinated dumps or unnecessary downward pressure.

4. Positive signaling to the market & community
   When governance participants themselves accept fixed ASTR compensation (instead of insisting on USD value protection), it sends a strong message: “We believe in the future value of ASTR.”

Minor improvements I would suggest considering

To make adoption smoother and reduce risk of contributor churn if price stays low for a long time, the following small adjustments could be discussed:

• Start the reference price slightly lower (e.g. $0.04 or $0.045) to reduce immediate perceived reduction in value

• Introduce a minimum mandatory distribution floor (e.g. 30–40% of accumulated amount must be paid out at least every two quarters) to avoid prolonged zero-cash-flow periods for active contributors

• Allow periodic review of the reference price (e.g. every 12–18 months) through a standard governance proposal, so the system remains adaptable without requiring emergency referendums

Overall, I consider the proposed model clearly superior in terms of sustainability, fairness to the treasury, and philosophical alignment with decentralized, community-first governance.

[okeygalile0]

I fully agree with this structure and the direction Astar Foundation is taking. The shift toward fixed ASTR-based quarterly compensation creates transparency, predictability, and long-term alignment. It clearly shows that this is about sustainability and ecosystem strength, not short-term incentives.

The differentiation between ACC, AFC, and AAF also makes sense. Governance roles (ACC/AFC) carry defined oversight responsibilities, so their fixed quarterly compensation of 48,000 ASTR reflects structured accountability. Meanwhile, the Ambassador Fellowship operates under a more flexible contribution model, which justifies the tiered base + performance bonus system.

I especially like the philosophy that ambassador rewards are recognition-based, not salaries. That distinction is important. It keeps the ecosystem mission-driven rather than transactional.

However, I think the model could be improved further by introducing a more dynamic contribution multiplier system. For example:

• The more measurable impact an ambassador creates (content reach, developer onboarding, partnerships, community growth, events, governance participation),

• The higher the performance coefficient applied to their base reward.

Instead of only having a fixed base + capped bonus (e.g., 25k + 5k), there could be scalable tiers where exceptional contributors can unlock higher quarterly brackets over time.

For example:

• Performance Score 1.0 → 100% base

• Performance Score 1.25 → 125% base

• Performance Score 1.5 → 150% base

This would strongly incentivize long-term commitment and real impact, not just activity. The principle would be simple: the more value you create for the ecosystem, the more you earn.

[CJorgeSaez]

Hi everyone,

Thank you so much for opening this thread in alignment with the Astar Foundation Forward initiative. It’s undoubtedly a very positive and healthy step for the ecosystem as a whole.

I fully understand and appreciate the principle behind the proposal:

• When the market falls, the members of the governing bodies demonstrate commitment.

  When the price breaks above the anchor, they benefit from this due to their demonstrated commitment during unfavorable market conditions.

This fosters strong alignment with the token and protects the treasury during challenging times.

Having an anchor price for calculating compensation seems excellent to me, as Poggi suggests. However, regarding the amount, I think we should carefully analyze whether it accurately reflects the current market reality and that guarantees a balance between contributors and the sustainability of the ecosystem.

• The proposed Anchor Price is currently $0.05.
• However, the Current Price is $0.0077.

This means we are currently 6.5x or 549% away from the anchor price. It’s important to note that the last time a move of this magnitude occurred was in 2023 when the price went from $0.04 to $0.2, making a 5x or 400% increase in the bull run. Since then, we have had prices lower than that for over two years.

I only mention this to more clearly illustrate the implications of the current anchor price.

Taking into account the same shared structure of the governing bodies, at the current price it would be:

Astar Community Council (ACC)

• Full Members: 48,000 ASTR ≈ $369.6 per quarter per member (4 members)

  • ≈ $123 monthly

Astar Finance Committee (AFC)

• Full Members: 48,000 ASTR ≈ $369.6 per quarter per member (5 members)

  • ≈ $123 monthly

• Observer: 18,000 ASTR ≈ 138.6 per quarter per member (1 member)

  • $46.2 monthly

Astar Ambassador Fellowship (AAF)

• Head Ambassadors (0 members):

  • Base Compensation: 25,000 ASTR per quarter per ambassador

  • Performance Bonus: Up to 5,000 ASTR based on individual performance

  • Total: 30,000 ASTR ≈ $231

    • $77 monthly

• Mid Ambassadors (10):

  • Base Compensation: 16,000 ASTR per quarter per ambassador

  • Performance Bonus: Up to 4,000 ASTR based on individual performance

  • Total: 20,000 ASTR ≈ $140

    • $46.6 monthly

• Ambassadors (0):

  • Base Compensation: 8,000 ASTR per quarter per ambassador

  • Performance Bonus: Up to 2,000 ASTR based on individual performance

  • Total: 10,000 ASTR ≈ $77

    • $25.6 monthly

This is taking into account that current market conditions are generally unfavorable and that we will likely continue to see a downward trend for several more cycles. For example, if Bitcoin reaches the $50k-$40k levels again, which it is not far from currently, we could see the price of ASTR in the $0.004-$0.003 range or even lower, which would further impact the current governing bodies. At the same time, we must consider that these volatility cycles can last 1-2 years or even longer, which represents 4-8 or more quarterly cycles.

In this sense, I believe it is necessary to establish an Anchor Price that better adapts to market realities over time, that contributes to the sustainability of the ecosystem, and that does not shift the entire impact of volatility onto the governing bodies.

One suggestion I would make in this regard is:

Dynamic Anchor Price (DAP): This is the average price of the last two quarterly cycles. To calculate this average, the closing price of the first day of the first cycle and the closing price of the last day of the second cycle in question would be taken into account, or a weighted average of the last 180 days, thus avoiding the influence of days where there were extreme volatility peaks that could influence the reference prices used to calculate this average.

• This Dynamic Anchor Price will be used to calculate rewards for the next two cycles.
• The Dynamic Anchor Price will be updated if, at the time of calculation, the price changes by 20% or more compared to the previous price.

July 1: ASTR = $0.023
December 31: ASTR = $0.010
Average Price: $0.0165

This price now represents 2.14x or 114% of the current price.

Using the same calculations with this price, the structure would look like this.

Astar Community Council (ACC)

• Full Members: 145,000 ASTR ≈ $1,116 per quarter per member (4 members)

  • ≈ $372 monthly

Astar Finance Committee (AFC)

• Full Members: 145,000 ASTR ≈ $1,116 per quarter per member (5 members)

  • ≈ $372 monthly

• Observer: 54,000 ASTR ≈ $415 per quarter per member (1 member)

  • $138.3 monthly

Astar Ambassador Fellowship (AAF)

• Head Ambassadors (0 members):

  • Base Compensation: 75,000 ASTR per quarter per ambassador

  • Performance Bonus: Up to 15,000 ASTR based on individual performance

  • Total: 90,000 ASTR ≈ $693

    • $231 monthly

• Mid Ambassadors (10):

  • Base Compensation: 48,000 ASTR per quarter per ambassador

  • Performance Bonus: Up to 12,000 ASTR based on individual performance

  • Total: 60,000 ASTR ≈ $420

    • $140 monthly

• Ambassadors (0):

  • Base Compensation: 24,000 ASTR per quarter per ambassador

  • Performance Bonus: Up to 6,000 ASTR based on individual performance

  • Total: 30,000 ASTR ≈ $495

    • $165 monthly

At this price, we would be maintaining a balance between the sustainability of the ecosystem and the members of the governing bodies.

Likewise, we would be maintaining a balance in both bear and bull markets, avoiding a significant direct impact on the rewards of the members of the governing bodies, as well as excessive gains for them during periods of high upward volatility.

It’s important to note that this is just a suggestion to encourage discussion on this specific point.

Likewise, rewards could be paid using mixed models, for example, 50% of the Anchor Price / 50% of the current price.

An additional option, also used in various protocols, is payment in stablecoins linked to the ecosystem, for rewards, salaries, and even grants, especially when market conditions are unfavorable.

We can see this in the Ethereum ecosystem with the use of DAI for these purposes, or even in the Binance ecosystem with the use of USDT based on BSC. In this case, it would be the USDSC. This not only completely eliminates the selling pressure that the payment of governance rewards might exert, but this pressure goes alongside purchases, thus incentivizing the purchase and acquisition of ASTR for various uses, whether to buy especially when the market is down, to participate in governance and/or in the DeFi/Gaming platforms and products of the ecosystem.

Regarding the collective’s participation in governance for decision-making on reward distribution, while I understand that it’s a mechanism that promotes participation in governance and decentralizes decision-making, I believe that with the proposed ASTR-based reward model, it wouldn’t be necessary. In fact, if rewards accumulate over several periods, selling pressure will be greater at the time of payment since the tokens will be held, at least in this respect.

However, I fully agree that incentivizing the collective’s active participation in governance is important.

Overall, I love the proposal and believe it’s undoubtedly a great step towards sustainability, transparency, growth, and community participation.

I truly appreciate and applaud all the effort put in by the members involved in developing this proposal.

[Juminstock]

Hello, Astar Collective Contributors!

Thank you all for the incredible engagement on this proposal. The quality of every contribution demonstrates why Astar’s governance model is one of our greatest strengths.

I’m glad to see that all participants in this discussion are in favor of the shift to ASTR-based compensation. As has been well discussed, it is a necessary measure to preserve the value of our treasury while creating more grounded spending structures, as mentioned by @Poggi_Luca, @SimonB and @Marroz.

Now, speaking specifically about the ASTR reference price of 0.05, we must understand that this serves as an anchor for each underlying entity using this token, we’re talking about our treasuries and every member that is part of the Collective.

To understand the reasoning behind this price, let’s look at the 2025 historical data with full transparency:

• Q1 2025 average: $0.044

• Jan: $0.058
• Feb: $0.041
• Mar: $0.033

• Q2 2025 average: $0.027

• Apr: $0.027
• May: $0.030
• Jun: $0.025

• Q3 2025 average: $0.024

• Jul: $0.025
• Aug: $0.025
• Sep: $0.023

• Q4 2025 average: $0.015

• Oct: $0.020
• Nov: $0.014
• Dec: $0.011

Full year 2025 average: $0.0276

Why we propose $0.05 instead of the 2025 average:

The 2025 average of $0.0276 is heavily weighted by Q4’s significant downturn. However, Q1 2025 averaged $0.044, very close to our proposed $0.05. The reference price should serve as a credible anchor that reflects the ecosystem’s demonstrated value range while maintaining forward-looking conviction.

Using $0.05 accomplishes several objectives:

• Anchors close to where ASTR traded during stronger periods (Q1 2025)
• Remains credible without being unrealistically distant from recent price action
• Functions as a commitment signal rather than simply tracking trailing averages
• Balances recent performance with belief in the ecosystem’s recovery potential

Why $0.05 works as a commitment mechanism:

As @Poggi_Luca, @SimonB and others articulated, when ASTR trades below the reference price, governance contributors are working under less favorable conditions, not out of obligation, but out of belief. That shared exposure during difficult times has real cultural value. The reference price creates alignment precisely because it doesn’t constantly adjust. Setting it too close to today’s price loses that commitment signal.

So, your points are completely understandable, @CJorgeSaez, and while I agree on creating a structure that adapts to real market conditions, as @you425 also suggested, your estimates are still based on dollar-associated costs, only taking the current market state into account, which is precisely what we’re trying to reduce.

On the other hand, the review structure proposed by @you425 sounds interesting:

• Annual review: Main Council can propose reference price adjustments via public referendum
• Emergency criteria: Adjustments only if price is 200%+ above or 70%+ below reference for two consecutive quarters

These high thresholds discourage frequent tinkering while providing guardrails for exceptional circumstances.

But I want to ask you, what threshold would you propose for this?

Additionally, I find the discussion raised by @tksarah, @EzioRed, and @Poggi_Luca compelling, where it no longer makes much sense to hold quarterly votes to decide whether to issue compensations or not.

Arguments for maintaining (@you425, @Khonsa):
• Creates regular governance participation touchpoints
• Simple and meaningful for community engagement
• Could include minimum distribution floor (30-40% every two quarters) as middle ground

However, I’m persuaded by the streamlining arguments since ASTR-based compensation already achieves resource preservation. Perhaps the referendum could be optional, triggered only under specific circumstances (major volatility, treasury emergencies) rather than mandatory every quarter.

What do you all think guys?

@CJorgeSaez

An additional option, also used in various protocols, is payment in stablecoins linked to the ecosystem, for rewards, salaries, and even grants, especially when market conditions are unfavorable.

We can see this in the Ethereum ecosystem with the use of DAI for these purposes, or even in the Binance ecosystem with the use of USDT based on BSC. In this case, it would be the USDSC.

Finally, thanks for sharing this idea, @CJorgeSaez, but considering we are moving to an ASTR-based model, issuing compensations in USDSC would mean selling ASTR to acquire that stablecoin, which would significantly increase selling pressure depending on the amount to be issued.

From my point of view, this doesn’t make sense nor aligns with what we are proposing in the original document.

Again, the important thing here is not to benefit the individual but the Collective. We are all here with one mission: to serve the Collective, and the Collective is all of us.

Thank you for your thoughtful engagement. Let’s continue discussting this!

[you425]

@Juminstock

• Annual review: Main Council can propose reference price adjustments via public referendum
• Emergency criteria: Adjustments only if price is 200%+ above or 70%+ below reference for two consecutive quarters

These high thresholds discourage frequent tinkering while providing guardrails for exceptional circumstances.

But I want to ask you, what threshold would you propose for this?

Since the validity of thresholds is ultimately somewhat subjective, there may not be a single correct answer. However, I think it becomes easier to grasp if we convert everything into USD terms.

When comparing the reference price used for reward payments with the actual ASTR price at the time (I will set aside whether to use an average price for now, though I do think it should be used), the parameters should be based on how large of a deviation would be considered excessively high or excessively low. Let’s create an example based on the proposed thresholds.

Example:

Reference Price

• Reference price: $0.05
• Upper threshold: $0.15 (+200%)
• Lower threshold: $0.015 (-70%)

Rewards (Monthly)

• ACC/AFC (Full Member): $240 ~ $800 ~ $2400
• AFC (Observer): $90 ~ $300 ~ $900
• Head Ambassadors: $125 ~ $416 ~ $1250 (+Bonus)
• Mid Ambassadors: $80 ~ $266 ~ $800 (+Bonus)
• Ambassadors: $40 ~ $133 ~ $400 (+Bonus)

The above figures are converted into USD in the order of “lower bound ~ appropriate ~ upper bound,” and the key question is whether each of these would feel too high or too low at the respective lower and upper thresholds.

I intentionally calculated this on a monthly basis rather than quarterly, because quarterly amounts can appear disproportionately large. Converting to a monthly basis makes it easier to compare with a typical salary cycle.

Also, in my previous comment, I mentioned that “the lower bound should have a fixed minimum value.” The reason this is necessary is that the current ASTR price has already fallen below the -70% lower threshold. Therefore, I recommend setting $0.05 as the minimum floor for now. It would be reasonable to reconsider this again in one year.

As for whether the current upper and lower thresholds are appropriate, I believe the proposed values of +200% for the upper bound and -70% for the lower bound are suitable for now. The reason is that when Agent compensation was still token-denominated (about two years ago), the maximum upward deviation was roughly in that range. Of course, if that feels too high, the reference value could be lowered — but in that case, the lower bound should also be raised to maintain fairness. Currently, the price is already significantly below the lower threshold, and the upper threshold at this level does not seem problematic. As a result, I believe these thresholds are reasonably well balanced (narrowing them further could result in overly frequent rebalancing).

@Juminstock

However, I’m persuaded by the streamlining arguments since ASTR-based compensation already achieves resource preservation. Perhaps the referendum could be optional, triggered only under specific circumstances (major volatility, treasury emergencies) rather than mandatory every quarter.

What do you all think guys?

Yes, from a purely rational standpoint, I agree that there would be very little need for voting unless there is a specific reason.

So I think the key question is whether the goal is to increase governance participation opportunities.

• Rationally speaking, it is unnecessary
• However, it could still be worthwhile if the goal is to increase governance participation opportunities

That’s roughly how I see it.

[Juminstock]

Hello @you425 and thank you for this detailed analysis, I appreciate your inputs .

@you425

Reference Price

• Reference price: $0.05
• Upper threshold: $0.15 (+200%)
• Lower threshold: $0.015 (-70%)

Your proposed thresholds represent appropriate high volatility scenarios. After reviewing your analysis, I recommend the following adjustments to create responsive review opportunities while maintaining the commitment mechanism:

• Upper threshold: +100% (price reaches $0.10 or above)
• Lower threshold: -70% (price falls to $0.015 or below)

It’s important to clarify that the lower threshold becomes effective once ASTR reaches the $0.05 reference price. This means the -70% threshold applies going forward from that point, not retroactively to current price levels. The mechanism is designed to protect against significant deviations once the reference price has been achieved, ensuring we can respond to material changes without waiting a full year.

The anchor is designed to function as a commitment signal. If ASTR rises above $0.05 but stays within the upper threshold, we continue issuing the fixed ASTR amounts regardless of higher USD value. This is intentional, the upside rewards contributors for their conviction during difficult periods.

@you425

So I think the key question is whether the goal is to increase governance participation opportunities.

• Rationally speaking, it is unnecessary
• However, it could still be worthwhile if the goal is to increase governance participation opportunities

Agreed. As @Poggi_Luca noted, when compensation is denominated in ASTR, quarterly voting becomes unnecessary since the treasury’s obligation remains constant regardless of price fluctuations.

II. Next Steps:

Depending on the final feedback we receive through the end of this week, we will proceed as follows:

1. If aligned: We proceed to public referendum (via Remark system) on the $0.05 reference with +200% or +100%/-70% thresholds
2. If not aligned: We reopen discussion and establish variations based on community feedback
3. Timeline: Coordinate with Tokenomics 3.0 and dApp Staking governance processes

The referendum will execute once annually with potential re-evaluations only if thresholds are triggered.

Final comments welcome before we move forward.

[you425]

@Juminstock

It’s important to clarify that the lower threshold becomes effective once ASTR reaches the $0.05 reference price. This means the -70% threshold applies going forward from that point, not retroactively to current price levels. The mechanism is designed to protect against significant deviations once the reference price has been achieved, ensuring we can respond to material changes without waiting a full year.

I see — that certainly makes sense. Not activating the thresholds until the ASTR price reaches $0.05 is a logical approach. In that case, I don’t see any issues with it.

[EzioRed]

I think the approach being taken is correct. I believe the take of having referendums are appropriate when necessary and required.